The Fukushima nuclear disaster was profoundly a man-made one, resulting from the organizational failure of nuclear emergency preparedness. To fully understand the cause of this disaster, I propose to extend an organizational perspective on disasters into a macro-institutional perspective on disaster preparedness. To this end, I borrow from science and technology studies the concepts of "sociotechnical imaginary" and "civic epistemology" to probe the deepest layers of meaning-making constitutive of disaster preparedness. I then apply these concepts to the history of nuclear energy in postwar Japan that was centered on the developmental state pursuing industrial transformation. Specifically, I illustrate how the "pacifist imaginary" emphasized positive contributions of "the peaceful use of nuclear energy," legitimating a priori the promotion of nuclear power as a means of economic development; and how the "technocratic epistemology" invoked the superior competencies of state bureaucrats and expert advisers, legitimating post hoc their disregard for the possibility of a severe accident. The imaginary and epistemology thus enabled the developmental state to pursue pro-nuclear policy by securing acquiescence from the majority of citizens and discrediting the minority of antinuclear activists – until the earthquake and tsunami exposed the preparedness failure in March 2011.

福岛核灾难是一场深刻的人为灾难，是核应急准备工作组织失误造成的。为了充分理解这场灾难的原因，我建议将灾难的组织视角扩展到灾难准备的宏观制度视角。为此，我借用科学技术研究中的“社会技术想象”和“公民认识论”的概念来探讨备灾构成的最深层意义。然后，我将这些概念应用于战后日本以追求工业转型的发展状态为中心的核能历史。具体来说，我举例说明“和平主义的想象”如何强调“和平利用核能”的积极贡献，使促进核电作为经济发展手段的先验合法化；以及“技术官僚主义认识论”如何援引国家官僚和专家顾问的卓越能力，使他们对严重事故可能性的事后漠视合法化。因此，想象和认识论使发展型国家能够通过获得大多数公民的默许并诋毁少数反核活动家来推行亲核政策——直到 2011 年 3 月地震和海啸暴露了准备工作的失败。合法化事后他们对严重事故可能性的无视。因此，想象和认识论使发展型国家能够通过获得大多数公民的默许并诋毁少数反核活动家来推行亲核政策——直到 2011 年 3 月地震和海啸暴露了准备工作的失败。合法化事后他们对严重事故可能性的无视。因此，想象和认识论使发展型国家能够通过获得大多数公民的默许并诋毁少数反核活动家来推行亲核政策——直到 2011 年 3 月地震和海啸暴露了准备工作的失败。