In crowdsourcing services, employers often post some complex (or difficult) tasks that individual workers cannot complete independently. In this paper, we investigate that a group of independent workers willingly form a workers coalition by pooling their capacities together to jointly complete a crowdsourcing task, with the goal of being to obtain a reward from an employer. The capacity pooling games in the crowdsourcing service setting are formulated as optimization problems. Using the duality theory of a linear program, we not only establish that the core of the capacity pooling game is nonempty but also provide a simple way to compute a fair profit allocation policy in the bidding mode, employment mode and contrast mode of crowdsurcing services, respectively. Then, we further analyze the capacity pooling games with concave investment cost and convex quality reward structures, which exhibit the economies of scale and quality incentives. More interestingly, we give a constructive proof to the nonemptiness of the core of the resulting capacity pooling game with nonlinear structures.

在众包服务中，雇主经常发布一些个体工人无法独立完成的复杂（或困难）的任务。在本文中，我们调查了一群独立工人自愿组成工人联盟，将他们的能力集中在一起，共同完成一项众包任务，目标是从雇主那里获得奖励。众包服务设置中的容量池游戏被表述为优化问题。利用线性规划的对偶理论，我们不仅确立了容量池博弈的核心是非空的，而且还提供了一种简单的方法来计算众包服务的投标模式、雇佣模式和对比模式下的公平利润分配策略，分别。然后，我们进一步分析了具有凹投资成本和凸质量奖励结构的容量池博弈，它们表现出规模经济和质量激励。更有趣的是，我们对由此产生的具有非线性结构的容量池游戏的核心的非空性给出了建设性的证明。