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Soft Commitments, Reminders, and Academic Performance
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics ( IF 5.5 ) Pub Date : 2019-04-01 , DOI: 10.1257/app.20170288
Oliver Himmler 1 , Robert Jäckle 2 , Philipp Weinschenk 3
Affiliation  

A large share of students in higher education graduates with delay or fails to obtain a degree at all. In our field experiment, students can sign a non-binding agreement and self-commit to staying on track for graduation. We provide first evidence that soft commitment devices can enhance educational progress and -- more generally -- improve the completion of complex tasks such as passing exams. A pure reminder treatment does not change behavior, suggesting that the effects are not driven by increased salience. As predicted by a simple decision model, we show that procrastinators benefit most from the soft commitment device.

中文翻译:

软承诺、提醒和学业成绩

高等教育中很大一部分学生延迟或根本无法获得学位。在我们的实地实验中,学生可以签署不具约束力的协议,并自行承诺按计划毕业。我们提供了第一个证据,证明软承诺设备可以提高教育进度,更一般地说,可以提高复杂任务的完成率,例如通过考试。纯粹的提醒处理不会改变行为,这表明影响不是由显着性增加驱动的。正如一个简单的决策模型所预测的那样,我们表明拖延者从软承诺设备中获益最多。
更新日期:2019-04-01
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