We investigate the links between capital cities, conflict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that the latter is rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. We show evidence for two key predictions: (i) conflict is more likely to emerge (and dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capitals are associated with misgovernance. The predictions hold only for relatively nondemocratic countries, and for intrastate conflicts over government (as opposed to territory) – exactly the cases where our central assumption should apply.

中文翻译：

---

首都、冲突和治理不善

我们调查了首都、冲突和治理质量之间的联系，从这样一个假设出发，即现任精英受到叛乱威胁的约束，而叛乱威胁会因远离政治权力所在地而变得不那么有效。我们展示了两个关键预测的证据：（i）冲突更有可能在靠近首都的地方出现（并驱逐现任者），以及（ii）孤立的首都与治理不善有关。这些预测仅适用于相对非民主的国家，以及国家内部关于政府（而不是领土）的冲突——正是我们的中心假设应该适用的情况。