This paper accomplishes two tasks. First, I examine in detail Edmund Husserl’s earliest philosophy of surrogates, as it is found in his 1890 “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic)”. I analyze his psychological and logical investigations of surrogates, where the former is concerned with explaining how these signs function and the latter with how they do so reliably. His differentiation of surrogates on the basis of their genetic origins and degrees of necessity is discussed. Second, the historical importance of this text is disclosed by showing how Semiotic serves as both the inspiration for, and the foil to, Husserl’s 1901 First Logical Investigation. Husserl not only adopts the idea that linguistic signs can function via association, but also maintains that such signs can motivate me to execute one of two experiences. The key difference between the texts is that Husserl abandons his theory of surrogates in 1901, instead holding that I can experience absent objects by means of empty intentions. The reasons why Husserl found it necessary to transform this tenet of his philosophy are discussed at length.

中文翻译：

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替代品和空意：胡塞尔的“论符号逻辑”作为他第一次逻辑研究的蓝图

本文完成了两个任务。首先，我详细研究了埃德蒙·胡塞尔最早的代理哲学，正如他在 1890 年的“论符号逻辑（符号学）”中所发现的那样。我分析了他对代理人的心理和逻辑研究，其中前者关注解释这些符号的运作方式，后者关注它们如何可靠地运作。讨论了他根据其遗传起源和必要程度对代理人进行的区分。其次，通过展示符号学如何作为胡塞尔 1901 年第一次逻辑研究的灵感和衬托，揭示了本文的历史重要性。胡塞尔不仅采用语言符号可以通过联想起作用的观点，而且坚持认为这些符号可以激励我执行两种体验中的一种。文本之间的主要区别在于，胡塞尔在 1901 年放弃了他的代理人理论，而是认为我可以通过空洞的意图来体验不在场的对象。胡塞尔认为有必要改变他的哲学原则的原因得到了详细讨论。