I defend a Husserlian account of self-consciousness against representationalist accounts: higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism. Of these, self-representationalism is the harder to refute since, unlike higher-order representationalism, it does not incur a regress of self-conscious acts. However, it incurs a regress of intentional contents. I consider, and reject, five strategies for avoiding this regress of contents. I conclude that the regress is inherent to self-representationalism. I close by showing how this incoherence obtrudes in what must be the self-representationalist’s account of the phenomenology of experience.

中文翻译：

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表示与回归

我捍卫胡塞尔对自我意识的描述，反对表征主义的描述：高阶表征主义和自我表征主义。其中，自我表征主义更难反驳，因为与高阶表征主义不同，它不会导致自我意识行为的倒退。然而，它会导致有意内容的回归。我考虑并拒绝了五种避免内容倒退的策略。我得出的结论是，这种倒退是自我表征主义所固有的。最后，我展示了这种不连贯性如何在自我表象主义者对经验现象学的解释中突显出来。