Critics of Kant’s moral philosophy often object that his emphasis on individual autonomy makes him unable to account for our ‘second-personal’ or ‘bipolar’ duties. These are duties we owe to other people rather than duties we have with respect to them – as we might have duties with respect to the environment or works of art. With a recent and novel formulation of this objection as my foil, I argue that the apparent force of the ‘bipolarity’ objections rests on a failure to appreciate Kant’s inherently practical approach to ethics. On the positive side, reflection on criticisms of Kant’s treatment of ‘bipolar’ normativity helps to shed new light on his conception of practical agency and its place in his system of morals.

中文翻译：

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康德代理人及其重要他人

康德道德哲学的批评者经常反对说，他对个人自主性的强调使他无法解释我们的“第二人称”或“两极”义务。这些是我们应尽的职责到其他人而不是我们的职责关于他们——因为我们可能有职责关于环境或艺术品。以这种反对意见的最近和新颖的表述作为我的陪衬，我认为“两极”反对意见的明显力量在于未能理解康德固有的实践伦理方法。从积极的方面来说，对康德对“两极”规范性处理的批评的反思有助于揭示他的实践能动性概念及其在他的道德体系中的位置。