The prohibition on using others ‘merely as means’ is one of the best-known and most influential elements of Immanuel Kant’s moral theory. But it is widely regarded as impossible to specify with precision the conditions under which this prohibition is violated. On the basis of a re-examination of Kant’s texts, the article develops a novel account of the conditions for using someone ‘merely as a means’. It is argued that this account has not only strong textual support but also significant philosophical advantages over alternative conceptions.

中文翻译：

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如何“仅作为手段”使用某人

禁止使用他人“仅作为手段”是伊曼纽尔·康德道德理论中最著名和最有影响力的要素之一。但人们普遍认为不可能准确地说明违反该禁令的条件。在重新审视康德文本的基础上，本文对“仅作为手段”使用某人的条件进行了新颖的描述。有人认为，这种说法不仅具有强大的文本支持，而且与其他概念相比具有显着的哲学优势。