This article analyzes the regulatory measures adopted to address the potential contribution of hedge funds to financial instability in the U.S. and the EU in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. The relevant provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act include two sets of direct regulatory measures. The first set of these measures addresses information problems, whereas the second set is intended to address potential too-big-to-fail problems by imposing prudential regulation on systemically important nonbank financial companies. The article then studies the Volcker Rule, as an indirect regulatory measure intended to address the potential systemic risk of hedge funds originating from their interconnectedness with Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs). The second part of this article analyzes the European Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and its attempt to address the potential contribution of hedge funds to financial instability.Despite the common driving forces of hedge fund regulation across the Atlantic, ultimate policy outcomes were significantly divergent. Primarily concerned with creating a single market for Alternative Investment Funds, EU regulators prioritized the EU passport mechanism, which engendered demand for investor protection and more stringent and direct regulatory measures. In contrast, the main concern in the U.S. remained to be addressing potential systemic risk of hedge funds. Such differential regulatory objectives gave birth to indirect regulation of hedge funds with a focus on their interconnectedness with LCFIs. This is mainly embedded in the provisions of the Volcker Rule; a rule whose absence is significantly palpable in the EU regime for regulating hedge funds.

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监管分歧的故事：对比跨大西洋政策反应与所谓的另类投资基金在金融不稳定中的作用

本文分析了为应对全球金融危机后对冲基金对美国和欧盟金融不稳定的潜在影响而采取的监管措施。《多德-弗兰克法案》的相关规定包括两套直接监管措施。第一套措施解决信息问题，而第二套措施旨在通过对具有系统重要性的非银行金融公司实施审慎监管来解决潜在的“大到不能倒”问题。然后，文章研究了沃尔克规则，作为一种间接监管措施，旨在解决对冲基金与大型复杂金融机构 (LCFI) 的相互关联所带来的潜在系统性风险。本文的第二部分分析了关于另类投资基金经理的欧洲指令及其试图解决对冲基金对金融不稳定的潜在影响的尝试。尽管跨大西洋对冲基金监管的共同驱动力，最终政策结果存在显着差异。欧盟监管机构主要关注为另类投资基金创建单一市场，优先考虑欧盟护照机制，这引发了对投资者保护和更严格和直接监管措施的需求。相比之下，美国的主要担忧仍然是解决对冲基金潜在的系统性风险。这种差异化的监管目标催生了对冲基金的间接监管，重点是它们与 LCFI 的相互关联。这主要体现在沃尔克规则的规定中；在欧盟监管对冲基金的制度中，这一规则的缺失显而易见。