Since 2012, Mogadishu has been the site of both unprecedented optimism around the reconstruction of the Somali state, as well as persistent violence perpetrated by the Islamist militants of Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidiin (Al Shabaab). In attacking hotels and restaurants, as well as other sites broadly associated with the state, Al Shabaab has prosecuted a strategy intended to foment the ungovernability of the city, undermine the nascent Federal Government of Somalia‘s claims to authority, and denounce the alleged ―foreign‖ capture of the re-emerging state. Based on discursive analyses of local political commentary, and fieldwork in Mogadishu, this article examines media contestation between the re-emerging state and the armed opposition in a context of prolonged political fragmentation. The article argues that not only does the highly decentralized and transnational modern media environment facilitate a dynamic and dialogic exchange of propaganda between the state and the insurgents but, furthermore, the technological context of this discursive contestation has important implications for the ways in which counter-terrorism and state reconstruction are undertaken by political and military actors on the ground. ON 1 NOVEMBER 2015, HARAKAT AL SHABAAB AL MUJAAHIDIIN (Al Shabaab) detonated a car bomb at the fortified gate of the Saxafi ( ̳Journalist‘) Hotel in downtown Mogadishu, opposite the Somali Police Force‘s Criminal Investigation Directorate. In the following hours, gunmen moved through the hotel killing their stated targets: politicians, members of state security forces, and other civilian bystanders. As this was happening, an Al Shabaab representative made direct contact with a foreign journalist to confirm the group‘s responsibility for the attack. 1 At the same time, pro-militant radio broadcast a live phone interview with the fighters who were themselves eventually overwhelmed by US-trained  Peter Chonka is a teaching fellow at King‘s College London and a post-doctoral research associate at Durham University (peter.chonka@kcl.ac.uk). The author would like to thank the editors and anonymous peer-reviewers for their feedback and advice. He would also like to express his gratitude to Mogadishu University, all informants, and those friends and former colleagues who facilitated his fieldwork in the city. For reasons the article explains, these individuals remain anonymous. 1 BBC correspondent Mary Harper, Tweet, 1 November 2015, (accessed 1 November 2015). 2 National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) special forces. 2 Between 2014 and 2017, seven other large hotels in Mogadishu were directly attacked in a similar manner, some on more than one occasion, resulting in an estimated 150 fatalities. 3 Three months after the Saxafi Hotel attack, Al Shabaab militants stormed the Beach View cafe on Mogadishu‘s Liido beach killing 17 people, mostly civilians. The victims had been relaxing next to the white sands and turquoise waters of a beach that has become a potent symbol of the city‘s apparent rebirth, a testament to improved security, and the return of diaspora visitors and investors contributing to an apparent renaissance of the Somali capital. 4 Somali social media responded to the violence with the #tweetliidopictures Twitter hashtag, calling on users to post positive images of the beach being enjoyed by Mogadishu residents and visitors alike. 5 These attacks – along with numerous others which have punctuated political and economic change in Mogadishu since 2012 – direct this article‘s focus towards the targeting of spectacular forms of political violence in the context of Somali state reconstruction and ―new‖ media development. Following Zeynep Tukefci and Christopher Wilson, new media is understood here as a ̳connectivity infrastructure [that] should be analyzed as a complex ecology rather than in terms of any specific platform or device‘. 6 Post Arab Spring scholarship has highlighted the influence of transnational satellite news television and social media on both the discursive context of political debate and opportunities available for 2 Andalus Radio, ‘Idaacadda Andalus Oo baahisay codad laga duubay walaalihii fuliyey howlgalkii Hotel Saxafi’ [Andalus Radio broadcasts recording of the brothers who carried out the Hotel Saxafi operation], 1 November 2015 (3 November 2015). 3 A conservative estimate based on a survey of media reporting of average death-tolls of each attack. Figures vary between sources and consolidated data from multiple healthcare providers is limited. Estimate includes attackers, security forces and civilians. This article was accepted for publication before the Zoobe junction truck bombing of 14 October 2017 that killed more than 500 people. Although this detonated outside (and seriously damaged) the Safari Hotel, it is unlikely that this was the intended target on this occasion. 4 Laura Hammond, ̳Somalia rising: Things are starting to change for the world's longest failed state‘, Journal of Eastern African Studies 7, 1 (2013), pp. 183-193. 5 Abdi Latif Dahir, ̳Somalia‘s Lido Beach: The heart of Mogadishu and the place my friends died‘, The Guardian, 1 March 2016, < https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/01/somalia-lidobeach-heart-mogadishu-place-my-friends-died> (12 April 2017). 6 Zeynep Tukefci and Christopher Wilson, ̳Social media and the decision to participate in political protest: Observations from Tahrir Square‘, Journal of Communication 62, 2 (2012) pp. 363-379, p. 365. 3 popular mobilisation. 7 The emancipatory potential of decentralized media technologies is highly contested and debates increasingly emphasize the importance of the particular political environments in which such networks have gained prominence. 8 As such, and in the Horn of Africa context, Iginio Gagliardone stresses the need to look beyond the media suppression/emancipation debates to understand a state such as Ethiopia‘s use of new media technologies for particular developmental priorities. 9 Neighbouring Somalia differs in that its Federal Government (FGS) does not represent an established and coherent authoritarian power adapting to (or taking advantage of) a changing media environment. Instead, state power is being slowly reconstructed in the context of a highly decentralized and fragmented electronic public sphere that has emerged as part of the telecommunications boom in the hitherto largely stateless economy. 10 Although an achievement of the FGS has been its communicative self-reassertion since 2012 through control of ―state‖ media such as Somali National Television or Radio Mogadishu, it is nonetheless bound to compete in a media landscape that it cannot dominate in any systematic fashion. Media is nonetheless highly important for state reconstruction, facilitating a ̳politics of participation‘ in the ongoing federal reconfiguration of the country and defining the scope of debate around ̳Somali-owned‘ constitution-making and post-conflict transition. 11 Elsewhere, studies of the Somali media ecology have illuminated commercial logics which underpin news production in a conflict environment, influencing patterns of violence against 7 Naomi Sakr, Arab television today (IB Tauris, London, 2007); Marc Lynch, ̳After Egypt: The limits and promise of online challenges to the authoritarian Arab state‘, Perspectives on Politics 9, 2 (2011), pp. 301-310; Evgeny Morozov, The net delusion: The dark side of Internet freedom (Public Affairs, New York, NY, 2012); Axel Bruns, Tim Highfield, and Jean Burgess, ̳The Arab spring and social media audiences: English and Arabic twitter users and their networks‘, American Behavioral Scientist 57, 7 (2013), pp. 871-898; Gadi Wolfsfeld, Elad Segev and Tamir Sheafer, ̳Social media and the Arab spring: Politics comes first‘, The International Journal of Press/Politics 18, 2 (2013), pp. 115-137. 8 Lisa Anderson, ̳Demystifying the Arab spring.' Foreign Affairs 90, 3 (2011), pp. 2-7, p. 2. 9 Iginio Gagliardone, ̳New media and the developmental state in Ethiopia‘, African Affairs 113, 451 (2014), pp. 279-299. 10 Bob Feldman, ̳Somalia: Amidst the rubble, a vibrant telecommunications infrastructure‘, Review of African Political Economy 34, 113 (2012), pp. 565-572. 11 Nicole Stremlau, ̳Constitution-making, media, and the politics of participation in Somalia‘, African Affairs 115, 459 (2016), pp. 225-245. 4 media workers and calling into question many of the normative assumptions of external observers around how journalists should and can operate in such settings. 12 In relation to other Somali political entities, Alice Hills illustrates the opportunities presented by the use of information and communications technology to more consolidated state structures such as the secessionist Republic of Somaliland. Importantly, she highlights the significant limitations faced by state actors in their use of such tools in extending state power, as well as logics of consensus that may override the political necessity of expanding direct hierarchical control over security agents in peripheral regions. 13 This article expands on these insights and focuses on media technology use in a highly conflicted capital city where (unlike Somaliland) an armed opposition both substantively challenges the internationally-recognised state, and has experience of providing alternative forms of governance. The article thus poses two questions. Firstly, how do the modern realities of Somali media (encompassing multiple overlapping ―old‖ and ―new‖ formats) affect a re-emerging state‘s ability to establish urban security control? Secondly, how do performances of targeted violence by militants both take advantage of – and reflect – this highly decentralized media ecology and contested ideological environment? The use of media by militant actors is hardly new, and terrorism has long emp

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摩加迪沙的新媒体、表演暴力和国家重建

自 2012 年以来，摩加迪沙一直是对索马里国家重建空前乐观的地方，也是伊斯兰激进分子 Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidiin (Al Shabaab) 持续实施的暴力活动的场所。在袭击酒店和餐馆以及与国家有广泛联系的其他场所时，青年党起诉了一项旨在煽动城市的不可管理性、破坏新生的索马里联邦政府对权威的主张，并谴责所谓的“外国”捕获重新出现的状态。基于对摩加迪沙当地政治评论的话语分析和实地考察，本文考察了在长期政治分裂的背景下重新崛起的国家与武装反对派之间的媒体争论。文章认为，高度分散和跨国的现代媒体环境不仅促进了国家与叛乱分子之间的动态和对话式宣传交流，而且，这种话语争论的技术背景对反击的方式也具有重要意义。恐怖主义和国家重建是由当地的政治和军事行为者进行的。2015 年 11 月 1 日，HARAKAT AL SHABAAB AL MUJAAHIDIIN（青年党）在摩加迪沙市中心 Saxafi (̳Journalist') 酒店的坚固大门引爆了一枚汽车炸弹，该酒店位于索马里警察部队刑事调查局对面。在接下来的几个小时里，枪手穿过酒店，杀死了他们指定的目标：政客、国家安全部队成员和其他平民旁观者。当这件事发生时，一名青年党代表与一名外国记者直接接触，以确认该组织对这次袭击负责。1 与此同时，支持激进分子的电台对那些最终被美国训练的战士压倒的战士进行了电话直播采访  Peter Chonka 是伦敦国王学院的教员和达勒姆大学的博士后研究员 (peter .chonka@kcl.ac.uk）。作者要感谢编辑和匿名同行审稿人的反馈和建议。他还要向摩加迪沙大学、所有知情人以及为他在该市进行实地考察提供便利的朋友和前同事表示感谢。由于文章解释的原因，这些人保持匿名。1 BBC 记者 Mary Harper，推特，2015 年 11 月 1 日，支持激进分子的电台广播了对最终被美国训练的战士压倒的战士的电话直播采访  Peter Chonka 是伦敦国王学院的教学研究员和达勒姆大学的博士后研究助理 (peter.chonka@kcl.ac 。英国）。作者要感谢编辑和匿名同行审稿人的反馈和建议。他还要向摩加迪沙大学、所有知情人以及为他在该市进行实地考察提供便利的朋友和前同事表示感谢。由于文章解释的原因，这些人保持匿名。1 BBC 记者 Mary Harper，推特，2015 年 11 月 1 日，支持激进分子的电台广播了对最终被美国训练的战士压倒的战士的电话直播采访  Peter Chonka 是伦敦国王学院的教学研究员和达勒姆大学的博士后研究助理 (peter.chonka@kcl.ac 。英国）。作者要感谢编辑和匿名同行审稿人的反馈和建议。他还要向摩加迪沙大学、所有知情人以及为他在该市进行实地考察提供便利的朋友和前同事表示感谢。由于文章解释的原因，这些人保持匿名。1 BBC 记者 Mary Harper，推特，2015 年 11 月 1 日，他还要向摩加迪沙大学、所有知情人以及为他在该市进行实地考察提供便利的朋友和前同事表示感谢。由于文章解释的原因，这些人保持匿名。1 BBC 记者 Mary Harper，推特，2015 年 11 月 1 日，他还要向摩加迪沙大学、所有知情人以及为他在该市进行实地考察提供便利的朋友和前同事表示感谢。由于文章解释的原因，这些人保持匿名。1 BBC 记者 Mary Harper，推特，2015 年 11 月 1 日，（2015 年 11 月 1 日访问）。2 国家情报和安全局 (NISA) 特种部队。2 2014 年至 2017 年间，摩加迪沙的其他七家大型酒店也以类似方式直接遭到袭击，其中一些酒店不止一次遭到袭击，估计造成 150 人死亡。3 在 Saxafi 酒店袭击事件发生三个月后，青年党武装分子袭击了摩加迪沙 Liido 海滩的 Beach View 咖啡馆，造成 17 人死亡，其中大部分是平民。受害者一直在海滩的白色沙滩和碧绿海水旁放松身心，该海滩已成为这座城市明显重生的有力象征，证明安全状况得到改善，侨民游客和投资者的回归为索马里的明显复兴做出了贡献首都。4 索马里社交媒体通过#tweetliidopictures Twitter 标签回应暴力事件，呼吁用户发布摩加迪沙居民和游客都喜欢的海滩的正面图片。5 这些袭击——以及自 2012 年以来摩加迪沙的政治和经济变革中的许多其他袭击——将本文的重点指向索马里国家重建和“新”媒体发展背景下的壮观形式的政治暴力。继 Zeynep Tukefci 和 Christopher Wilson 之后，新媒体在此被理解为一种连接基础设施 [that] 应该作为一个复杂的生态系统而不是任何特定平台或设备来分析。6 阿拉伯之春后奖学金突出了跨国卫星新闻电视和社交媒体对政治辩论的话语背景和 2 安达卢斯电台可用机会的影响，（2015 年 11 月 3 日）。3 基于对每次袭击平均死亡人数的媒体报道调查得出的保守估计。数据因来源而异，来自多个医疗保健提供者的综合数据有限。估计数包括攻击者、安全部队和平民。这篇文章在 2017 年 10 月 14 日发生的 Zoobe 路口卡车爆炸事件之前被接受发表，该事件造成 500 多人死亡。尽管这在 Safari Hotel 外面引爆（并严重损坏），但它不太可能是这次的预定目标。4 Laura Hammond, ̳索马里正在崛起：世界上最长的失败国家的情况正在开始改变”，《东非研究杂志》7, 1 (2013), pp. 183-193。5 Abdi Latif Dahir, ̳索马里的丽都海滩：摩加迪沙的中心和我朋友去世的地方”，《卫报》，2016 年 3 月 1 日，< https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/01/somalia-lidobeach-heart-mogadishu-place-my-friends-died>（2017 年 4 月 12 日）。6 Zeynep Tukefci 和 Christopher Wilson，《社交媒体和参与政治抗议的决定：来自解放广场的观察》，《通讯杂志》62，2 (2012) pp. 363-379，p。365. 3 全民动员。7 去中心化媒体技术的解放潜力备受争议，辩论日益强调此类网络在其中获得突出地位的特定政治环境的重要性。8 因此，在非洲之角的背景下，Iginio Gagliardone 强调需要超越媒体压制/解放辩论，以了解埃塞俄比亚等国家将新媒体技术用于特定发展重点的情况。9 邻国索马里的不同之处在于，其联邦政府 (FGS) 并不代表适应（或利用）不断变化的媒体环境的既定且连贯的专制权力。取而代之的是，在高度分散和支离破碎的电子公共领域的背景下，国家权力正在缓慢重建，该领域已成为迄今为止主要无国籍经济体中电信繁荣的一部分。10 尽管自 2012 年以来，通过控制索马里国家电视台或摩加迪沙电台等“国家”媒体，FGS 的成就一直是其在交流上的自我重申，但它仍然必须在无法以任何系统方式占据主导地位的媒体领域中竞争。 . 尽管如此，媒体对于国家重建非常重要，促进“参与政治”参与正在进行的国家联邦重组，并确定围绕“索马里人所有”的制宪和冲突后过渡的辩论范围。11 在其他地方，对索马里媒体生态的研究阐明了在冲突环境中支撑新闻制作的商业逻辑，影响了针对当今阿拉伯电视台 7 Naomi Sakr 的暴力模式（IB Tauris，伦敦，2007 年）；Marc Lynch，《埃及之后：网络挑战对专制阿拉伯国家的限制和承诺》，《政治观点》9, 2 (2011)，第 301-310 页；Evgeny Morozov，网络妄想：互联网自由的阴暗面（公共事务，纽约，纽约，2012 年）；Axel Bruns、Tim Highfield 和 Jean Burgess， ̳阿拉伯之春和社交媒体受众：英语和阿拉伯语推特用户及其网络，美国行为科学家 57, 7 (2013)，第 871-898 页；Gadi Wolfsfeld、Elad Segev 和 Tamir Sheafer，社交媒体和阿拉伯之春：政治至上”，《国际新闻/政治杂志》18, 2 (2013)，第 115-137 页。8 Lisa Anderson，揭开阿拉伯之春的神秘面纱。外交 90, 3 (2011), pp. 2-7, p. 2. 9 Iginio Gagliardone, ̳新媒体与埃塞俄比亚的发展状态', 非洲事务 113, 451 (2014), pp. 279-299。10 Bob Feldman, ̳索马里：在废墟中，一个充满活力的电信基础设施'，非洲政治经济评论 34, 113 (2012)，第 565-572 页。11 Nicole Stremlau，《宪法制定、媒体和参与索马里的政治》，非洲事务 115, 459 (2016)，第 225-245 页。4 媒体工作者，并质疑外部观察者关于记者在此类环境中应该如何以及可以如何运作的许多规范性假设。12 就索马里其他政治实体而言，爱丽丝希尔斯说明了使用信息和通信技术为更加统一的国家结构（例如分离主义的索马里兰共和国）带来的机会。重要的是，她强调了国家行为者在使用此类工具扩展国家权力时面临的重大限制，以及共识逻辑可能会超越扩大对外围地区安全代理人的直接等级控制的政治必要性。13 本文扩展了这些见解，重点介绍了在高度冲突的首都城市中媒体技术的使用（与索马里兰不同），那里（与索马里兰不同）武装反对派既对国际公认的国家提出实质性挑战，又拥有提供替代治理形式的经验。因此，这篇文章提出了两个问题。首先，索马里媒体的现代现实（包括多种重叠的“旧”和“新”格式）如何影响一个新兴国家建立城市安全控制的能力？其次，激进分子的有针对性的暴力行为如何利用并反映这种高度分散的媒体生态和有争议的意识形态环境？激进分子对媒体的使用并不是什么新鲜事，恐怖主义早已存在 并具有提供替代治理形式的经验。因此，这篇文章提出了两个问题。首先，索马里媒体的现代现实（包括多种重叠的“旧”和“新”格式）如何影响一个新兴国家建立城市安全控制的能力？其次，激进分子的有针对性的暴力行为如何利用并反映这种高度分散的媒体生态和有争议的意识形态环境？激进分子对媒体的使用并不是什么新鲜事，恐怖主义早已存在 并具有提供替代治理形式的经验。因此，这篇文章提出了两个问题。首先，索马里媒体的现代现实（包括多种重叠的“旧”和“新”格式）如何影响一个新兴国家建立城市安全控制的能力？其次，激进分子的有针对性的暴力行为如何利用并反映这种高度分散的媒体生态和有争议的意识形态环境？激进分子对媒体的使用并不是什么新鲜事，恐怖主义早已存在 激进分子的有针对性的暴力行为如何利用并反映这种高度分散的媒体生态和有争议的意识形态环境？激进分子对媒体的使用并不是什么新鲜事，恐怖主义早已存在 激进分子的有针对性的暴力行为如何利用并反映这种高度分散的媒体生态和有争议的意识形态环境？激进分子对媒体的使用并不是什么新鲜事，恐怖主义早已存在