Much of the promise of the good governance agenda in African countries since the 1990s rested on reforms aimed at 'getting the institutions right', sometimes by creating regulatory agencies that would be above the fray of partisan politics. Such 'institutional fix' strategies are often frustrated because the new institutions themselves are embedded in existing state structures and power relations. The article argues that implementing Kenya's land law reforms in the 2012-2016 period illustrates this dynamic. In Kenya, democratic structures and the 2010 constitutional devolution of power to county governments created a complex institutional playing field, the contours of which shaped the course of reform. Diverse actors in both administrative and representative institutions of the state, at both the national and county levels, were empowered as 'veto players' whose consent and cooperation was required to realize the reform mandate. An analysis of land administration reform in eight Kenyan counties shows how veto players were able to slow or curtail the implementation of the new land laws. Theories of African politics that focus on informal power networks and state incapacity may miss the extent to which formal state structures and the actors empowered within them can shape the course of reform, either by thwarting the reformist thrust of new laws or by trying to harness their reformist potential.

中文翻译：

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肯尼亚的土地法改革：权力下放、否决权和制度修复的局限性

自 1990 年代以来，非洲国家良好治理议程的大部分前景都依赖于旨在“使机构正确”的改革，有时是通过创建不受党派政治影响的监管机构。这种“制度修复”策略常常受挫，因为新制度本身嵌入在现有的国家结构和权力关系中。文章认为，肯尼亚在 2012-2016 年期间实施的土地法改革说明了这种动态。在肯尼亚，民主结构和 2010 年宪法权力下放给县政府创造了一个复杂的制度竞争环境，其轮廓塑造了改革进程。国家和县级行​​政和代表机构中的不同行为者，被赋予“否决权”的权力，他们的同意和合作是实现改革任务所必需的。对肯尼亚八个县的土地管理改革的分析表明，否决者如何能够减缓或限制新土地法的实施。关注非正式权力网络和国家无能的非洲政治理论可能忽略正式国家结构及其内部被授权的行为者可以在多大程度上影响改革进程，无论是通过挫败新法律的改革主义推动力，还是试图利用它们改良主义的潜力。