ABSTRACT Indian Prime Ministers occupy the pinnacle of India’s government, national security hierarchy, and nuclear command and control infrastructure, which allows them to make decisions that transform Indian nuclear strategy. However, within India’s nuclear decision-making bureaucracy, other actors including India’s nuclear scientists and engineers, the military, and democratic processes can also adjust Indian nuclear strategy which creates rivalry. This article argues that the Indian Prime Minister’s position gives them the ability to influence and direct these various domestic political actors to make a nuclear strategy that suits the Prime Minister’s interests. But as bureaucratic actors actually translate the Prime Minister’s directions into policy, it results in influence often falling short of control in setting nuclear strategy. Applying a bureaucratic model to the making of nuclear strategy, the article’s findings suggest that Prime Ministers have purposefully guided and overseen India’s post-Pokhran-II nuclear strategy beyond a “minimal” credible deterrent outlined in its 1999 official nuclear doctrine.

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瓦杰帕伊、辛格和莫迪：总理对印度核战略的影响

摘要 印度总理占据了印度政府、国家安全等级和核指挥与控制基础设施的顶峰，这使他们能够做出改变印度核战略的决策。然而，在印度的核决策官僚机构中，包括印度核科学家和工程师、军队和民主进程在内的其他参与者也可以调整印度的核战略，从而制造竞争。这篇文章认为，印度总理的地位使他们有能力影响和指导这些国内政治行为体制定符合总理利益的核战略。但是，由于官僚机构实际上将总理的指示转化为政策，因此在制定核战略时往往无法控制其影响力。