ABSTRACT The conventional wisdom among many analysts and policy-makers is that India’s central government has followed a fairly consistent internal security policy by deploying an “iron first in a velvet glove” that attacks irreconcilable armed groups, while holding open the door to mainstream politics for moderates. This article argues that this wisdom is incorrect. It instead offers a more political explanation of government strategy, showing that Delhi cares much more about some kinds of groups and conflicts than others, leading to a diverse pattern of strategies toward armed actors. Central government strategy is driven by varying political resolve for crackdowns and varying political space for either deal-making or neglect. Rather than a shared general approach, there is a far more selective and complex pattern of strategy. The paper examines both counterinsurgent conflicts and the murkier realm of private armies and armed political parties that blend “normal” politics with violence.

中文翻译：

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印度的内部安全战略

摘要 许多分析家和政策制定者的传统观点是，印度中央政府采取了相当一致的内部安全政策，部署了“戴上天鹅绒手套的铁拳”来攻击不可调和的武装团体，同时为主流政治敞开大门温和派。这篇文章认为这种智慧是不正确的。相反，它对政府战略提供了更具政治性的解释，表明德里比其他人更关心某些类型的群体和冲突，从而导致针对武装行为体的战略多样化。中央政府的战略是由不同的政治决心和不同的政治空间驱动的，无论是达成交易还是忽视。不是一种共享的一般方法，而是一种更具选择性和复杂性的战略模式。