ABSTRACT Political scientists and analysts have long argued that Indian strategic restraint is informed primarily by Indian political leaders’ aversion to the use of force. For some scholars, India’s apparent fixation with restraint can be traced to the very foundation of the modern Indian state. This article contests what it considers to be a reductionist position on strategic restraint. Instead, it argues that Indian strategic restraint has in fact been shaped more by structural issues such as the limited availability of logistics and capabilities, the impact of domestic political contest, the effect of international attention to a crisis and the need for international legitimacy, and the political, economic, and military cost-benefit analysis associated with the use of force and the potential for escalation. In sum, it contributes a historically grounded understanding of strategic restraint. The article looks closely at India’s decision-making process in one major experiment with the use of force against Pakistan in 1965. The case clearly shows that political leaders were hardly uncomfortable or unsure about the use of force. It was the military leadership at the time that sought to temper the ambitious and potentially escalatory policies considered by the then prime minister.

中文翻译：

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重新审视印度的“战略克制”：以 1965 年印巴战争为例

摘要 政治学家和分析家长期以来一直认为，印度的战略克制主要源于印度政治领导人对使用武力的厌恶。对于一些学者来说，印度对克制的明显执着可以追溯到现代印度国家的基础。本文对它所认为的关于战略克制的还原论立场提出质疑。相反，它认为印度的战略克制实际上更多地受到结构性问题的影响，例如物流和能力的有限可用性、国内政治竞争的影响、国际关注危机的影响以及对国际合法性的需求，以及与使用武力和升级潜力相关的政治、经济和军事成本效益分析。总共，它有助于对战略克制有历史根据的理解。这篇文章仔细研究了印度在 1965 年对巴基斯坦使用武力的一次重大实验中的决策过程。这个案例清楚地表明，政治领导人几乎不会对使用武力感到不安或不确定。当时的军事领导层试图缓和当时的总理考虑的雄心勃勃且可能升级的政策。