Ownership and control of defense industrial firms affords the military power, autonomy, and a claim to economic rents. Why do some countries succeed at shifting some or all such firms from military to civilian ownership and control, while others do not? I argue that differing configurations of relative civilian and military coalitional and institutional strength contribute to outcomes. Civilian and military must find party and executive-branch allies who can compete for them to craft or defeat legislation affecting their interests, but coalition building alone is insufficient. Actors must also cultivate executive bureaucratic institutions able to design and implement policies promoting their interests. How coalitions and institutions form, ossify, or fail to develop is assessed through a comparative study of Chile, Argentina (1983–1989), and Argentina (1989–1997).

国防工业公司的所有权和控制权提供了军事力量、自主权和对经济租金的要求。为什么有些国家成功地将部分或全部此类公司从军事所有权和控制权转移到平民所有权和控制权，而其他国家则没有？我认为，相对民事和军事联盟和制度力量的不同配置有助于结果。文职和军队必须找到可以与他们竞争的政党和行政部门的盟友，以制定或击败影响他们利益的立法，但仅靠建立联盟是不够的。行动者还必须培养能够设计和实施促进其利益的政策的行政官僚机构。通过对智利、阿根廷 (1983-1989)、