I.

Critique and Praxis can be read as a remarkable intellectual history of critical theory in the broadest sense, which demonstrates a highly sophisticated, original understanding of its concepts and methods, its historical, social and political contexts, as well as its unquestioned assumptions and limitations. Harcourt’s scholarship and depth of thought are impressive.

But Critique & Praxis is much more than that. It is a genuine intervention within, and a major contribution to, the field of critical theory, which Harcourt understands as a constantly renewed demand or exigency, at once theoretical and practical. Throughout, Harcourt insists on the necessary unity between the critical concepts and models he analyzes or constructs, and his own, multi-faceted praxis. This unity is itself a function of the feedback, transformative effects that theory and praxis produce on one another. This means that critique—its objects, concepts and practices—is never fixed in advance or set in stone. It is best described as a dynamic or process, one that is always responding to a specific situation, an evolving set of circumstances requiring tailored concepts and practices. His relation to the plethora of critical thinkers he draws on and engages with is driven by the (Foucauldian) idea that bodies of thought are conceptual toolboxes, which one should use (or not), and contribute to, but not criticise or polemicise with. The version of critical theory Harcourt offers us is pragmatic and open-ended.

Finally, Critique & Praxis is a philosophical credo, a political call to arms, an autobiography in the sense Du Bois uses when he speaks of Dusk of Dawn as an autobiography of a Problem. Harcourt’s autobiography is that of a Struggle (or a series of struggles), rooted in a strong political affectivity, and in forms of indignation in particular. His struggles—as a litigator in favor of those condemned to death or wrongfully convicted; representing indigent tenants being evicted or disabled people who are denied benefits; or demonstrating, marching, and occupying—are carried out in the name of social justice, equality, and dignity. They are aimed at the punitive society, and carry an abolitionist agenda: of the death penalty, the prison, the police, racial discrimination and oppression, the free-market economy that generates precarity and inequality, the Counterrevolution, digital surveillance, etc. The struggles in question involve different strategies and tactics which, following Foucault, Harcourt describes as “counterconducts.”

From the point of view of its method, Critique and Praxis is of course critical. But critique unfolds on three different levels: descriptive (or expository), hermeneutical (or interpretative), and prescriptive.

The book describes historical situations and social movements, sometimes at length, as in Chapter 15, where Harcourt discusses a range of leftist strategies and tactics, including Bernie Sanders’ “political revolution,” Chantal Mouffe’s Left Populism, #BlackLivesMatter, BYP100, the recent occupation and assembly movements, Butler’s Theory of Assembly, Hardt and Negri’s organizational principles for leftist revolt, the history and philosophy of political and civil disobedience (to which Harcourt himself contributed), secession, insurrection, etc., all of which, he claims, are justifiable tactics. Yet, for reasons that I will turn to later, this narrative, expository account of counterconducts is itself a function of Harcourt’s conception of critical praxis, which is entirely situation-specific and time-sensitive: there never was, or never will be, a single rule or model to follow. Tactics need to be invented, reinvented, adapted, and questioned.

The book is also an interpretation of critical concepts and key events. It is rooted in a specific (yet minimalist) concept of meaning related to that of illusion. I will return to this hermeneutical aspect of Harcourt’s conception of critique.

Finally, it is prescriptive, yet in a way that displaces and neutralizes the tradition question “What must we do?” by raising the more personal question “What (more) can I do?”, to which Harcourt devotes the fourth and final part of his book. He is explicit about the normative framework that drives his reconstructed critical theory. It is, he claims, “guided by the values that critical philosophy has always placed front and centre: equality, solidarity, social justice, and autonomy” (p. 230). This list is not exhaustive. It is not grounded in reason or rationality or science or God. It is context dependent. Depending on the historical situation, these values can lead to a greater or lesser sense of urgency, and even give way to new values. And they can be served or implemented through different means and tactics, different counterconducts, from revolutions to revolts, strikes, demonstrations, occupations, microinsurrections, litigation, and so forth. The one horizon or “promise” Harcourt seems to reject as no longer realistic, or even desirable, is that of Revolution, at least defined as the control of state power by a union of workers, pitted against the bourgeoisie. But more broadly, Harcourt rejects the very idea of a single, universal, and permanent solution. Struggles for equality and justice are endless, and always contextual. They need to be invented or adapted as the distribution and organization of power evolve (p. 435); they must never “exceed what is strictly necessary” (p. 436).

中文翻译：

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Critique & Praxis 是一项巨大的成就，将在未来几年内讨论

一世。

从最广泛的意义上讲，《批判与实践》可以被解读为一部非凡的批判理论思想史，它展示了对其概念和方法、其历史、社会和政治背景以及其无可置疑的假设和局限性的高度复杂的、独创的理解。哈考特的学识和思想深度令人印象深刻。

但批判与实践远不止这些。这是对批判理论领域的真正干预和重大贡献，哈考特将其理解为不断更新的需求或紧迫性，既是理论的又是实践的。自始至终，哈考特都坚持他分析或构建的批判性概念和模型与他自己的多方面实践之间的必要统一。这种统一本身就是理论和实践相互产生的反馈和变革效应的函数。这意味着批评——它的对象、概念和实践——从来没有预先固定或一成不变。最好将其描述为一个动态或过程，它始终对特定情况做出响应，这是一组需要量身定制的概念和实践的不断发展的环境。使用（或不使用），并做出贡献，但不批评或争论。哈考特为我们提供的批判理论版本是务实和开放的。

最后，《批判与实践》是一种哲学信条，是政治上的号召，是杜波依斯在谈到黎明黄昏时所使用的自传作为一个问题的自传。哈考特的自传是一部斗争（或一系列斗争）的自传，植根于强烈的政治情感，尤其是愤慨的形式。他的斗争——作为一名支持被判死刑或被错误定罪的人的诉讼律师；代表被驱逐的贫困租户或被剥夺福利的残疾人；或示威、游行和占领——都是以社会正义、平等和尊严的名义进行的。它们针对惩罚性社会，并带有废除死刑的议程：死刑、监狱、警察、种族歧视和压迫、导致不稳定和不平等的自由市场经济、反革命、数字监控等。所讨论的斗争涉及不同的战略和战术，按照福柯，

从它的方法来看，《批判与实践》当然是批判的。但是批判在三个不同的层次上展开：描述性（或说明性）、解释性（或解释性）和规定性。

这本书描述了历史情况和社会运动，有时很详细，如第 15 章，其中哈考特讨论了一系列左派战略和战术，包括伯尼桑德斯的“政治革命”、尚塔尔莫菲的左翼民粹主义、#BlackLivesMatter、BYP100、最近的占领和集会运动、巴特勒的集会理论、哈特和内格里的左派反抗组织原则、政治和公民不服从的历史和哲学（哈考特本人对此做出了贡献）、分裂国家、叛乱等，他声称，是合理的策略。然而，由于我将在后面提到的原因，这种对反行为的叙述性、说明性解释本身是哈考特批判实践概念的一个功能，它完全是针对特定情况和时间敏感的：从来没有，或者永远不会，要遵循的单一规则或模型。战术需要被发明、重新发明、调整和质疑。

这本书也是对关键概念和关键事件的解释。它植根于与幻觉相关的特定（但极简主义）意义概念。我将回到哈考特批判概念的这个解释学方面。

最后，它是规定性的，但在某种程度上取代并消除了“我们必须做什么？”的传统问题。通过提出更个人化的问题“我能做什么（更多）？”，哈考特在他的书的第四部分也是最后一部分致力于这个问题。他明确说明了驱动他重构的批判理论的规范框架。他声称，“以批判哲学始终置于前沿和中心的价值观为指导：平等、团结、社会正义和自治”（第 230 页）。此列表并非详尽无遗。它不是基于理性、理性、科学或上帝。它是上下文相关的。根据历史情况，这些价值观会导致或多或少的紧迫感，甚至让位于新的价值观。并且可以通过不同的手段和策略、不同的反行为来服务或实施它们，从革命到造反、罢工、示威、占领、微型起义、诉讼等等。哈考特似乎拒绝的一个视界或“承诺”不再现实，甚至是不可取的，是革命的视界，至少被定义为工人联盟控制国家权力，与资产阶级对抗。但更广泛地说，哈考特拒绝单一、普遍和永久解决方案的想法。争取平等和正义的斗争是无止境的，而且总是因人而异。随着权力的分配和组织的发展，它们需要被发明或调整（第 435 页）；他们绝不能“超出绝对必要的范围”（第 436 页）。甚至可取的是革命，至少被定义为由工人联盟控制国家权力，与资产阶级对抗。但更广泛地说，哈考特拒绝单一、普遍和永久解决方案的想法。争取平等和正义的斗争是无止境的，而且总是因人而异。随着权力的分配和组织的发展，它们需要被发明或调整（第 435 页）；他们绝不能“超出绝对必要的范围”（第 436 页）。甚至可取的是革命，至少被定义为由工人联盟控制国家权力，与资产阶级对抗。但更广泛地说，哈考特拒绝单一、普遍和永久解决方案的想法。争取平等和正义的斗争是无止境的，而且总是因人而异。随着权力的分配和组织的发展，它们需要被发明或调整（第 435 页）；他们绝不能“超出绝对必要的范围”（第 436 页）。随着权力的分配和组织的发展，它们需要被发明或调整（第 435 页）；他们绝不能“超出绝对必要的范围”（第 436 页）。随着权力的分配和组织的发展，它们需要被发明或调整（第 435 页）；他们绝不能“超出绝对必要的范围”（第 436 页）。