A dual-channel supply chain is considered in which a manufacturer sells its product through a traditional retailer and an e-tailer, wherein the e-tailer may adopt two, i.e., the conventional batch ordering and the drop-shipping, order fulfillment policies. The problem is modeled as Stackelberg games in which the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer and the e-tailer are the followers competing on price. Optimization models are developed and equilibrium solutions are obtained for unknown distributions of the uncertain demands through a distribution-free approach. Analytical solutions of pricing and ordering decisions are also derived when the uncertain demand is assumed to follow known distributions to evaluate the performance of the distribution-free approach. Numerical studies are conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the distribution-free approach and sensitivity analyses are performed to examine the effects of several important parameters on the equilibrium solutions. The choice of the e-tailer and the preference of the manufacturer for the order fulfillment policies are also analyzed through numerical studies when important parameters change. The results show that the e-tailer prefers the batch ordering policy if its market share is relatively large and its profit-sharing ratio is relatively low, the manufacturer prefers the batch ordering policy if the e-tailer’s market share is relatively small and the e-tailer’s profit-sharing ratio is relatively high, and both the e-tailer and the manufacturer prefer the drop-shipping policy for other situations. The drop-shipping policy benefits the manufacturer and the e-tailer when the channel substitutability is relatively low and the demand fluctuations are relatively high.

考虑双渠道供应链，其中制造商通过传统零售商和电子零售商销售其产品，其中电子零售商可以采用两种，即常规批量订购和一件代发的订单履行政策。该问题被建模为 Stackelberg 博弈，其中制造商是领导者，零售商和电子零售商是价格竞争的追随者。开发优化模型并通过无分布方法获得不确定需求的未知分布的平衡解。当假设不确定需求遵循已知分布以评估无分布方法的性能时，还可以推导出定价和订购决策的分析解决方案。进行了数值研究以评估无分布方法的有效性，并进行敏感性分析以检查几个重要参数对平衡解的影响。当重要参数发生变化时，还通过数值研究分析了电子零售商的选择和制造商对订单履行政策的偏好。结果表明，当市场份额较大且利润分成比例较低时，电子零售商更倾向于批量订购政策；如果电子零售商的市场份额相对较小，且电子零售商的利润分成比例相对较低，则制造商更倾向于批量订购政策。 -零售商的利润分享比例相对较高，对于其他情况，网络零售商和制造商都更喜欢代发货政策。