In the twenty-first century, democracies are most often weakened, and even die, not by coups but by manipulation from within by democratically-elected officials. Yet, while democratic breakdown has become increasingly common, significant variation exists in the strategies deployed by would-be autocrats. Although some engage in unconstitutional power grabs, an increasing number of incumbents instead deploy constitutional methods to consolidate their power. How do incumbents decide how far to ride the democracy train, and whether to attack democracy unlawfully, or subvert it legally from within? This paper explores this question by presenting a simple formal model to adjudicate between these two incumbent-led paths to autocracy. The model implies that leaders who retain military support can successfully conduct an executive coup yet prefer lawful means to grab power when they enjoy high popularity. Choosing the constitutional route to dismantle democracy provides aspiring autocrats with a guise of legality as well as expands their power beyond even the self-coup option. Using the insights of the model, the paper examines how Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who boarded the democracy train as a democratically elected leader but continued his journey toward a fully authoritarian destination, orchestrated his autocratic takeover of Turkish democracy. The article contributes to existing literature by examining the strategic decision-making process that underlies incumbent-led subversions of democracy, while casting light on the increasing trend of legal subversions of democracy.

在 21 世纪，民主最常被削弱甚至消亡的不是政变，而是民选官员从内部操纵。然而，虽然民主崩溃变得越来越普遍，但潜在的独裁者所采用的策略存在显着差异。尽管有些人从事违宪的权力攫取，但越来越多的现任者转而采用宪法手段来巩固自己的权力。在位者如何决定在民主列车上走多远，是非法攻击民主，还是从内部合法地颠覆民主？本文通过提出一个简单的正式模型来探讨这个问题，以在这两条现任领导的专制道路之间进行裁决。该模型暗示，保留军事支持的领导人可以成功地进行行政政变，但在享有较高声望时更喜欢通过合法手段夺取权力。选择废除民主的宪法途径为有抱负的独裁者提供了合法的幌子，并扩大了他们的权力，甚至超越了自我政变的选择。利用该模型的见解，本文研究了雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安（Recep Tayyip Erdoğan）如何策划他对土耳其民主的专制接管，他作为民主选举的领导人登上了民主列车，但继续朝着完全专制的目标前进。本文通过研究现任领导的民主颠覆的战略决策过程，为现有文献做出了贡献，同时阐明了合法颠覆民主的日益增长的趋势。