Purpose

Recent research shows that because of money-laundering risks, there has been an increase in the off-boarding of certain types of corporate clients in the financial sector. This phenomenon known as “de-risking” has been argued to have a negative impact on society, because it increases the possible risk of money laundering. The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the de-risking strategy of financial institutions results in an expansion of the regulatory framework concerning anti-money laundering focusing on off-boarding of clients and, if so, is there a way to avoid further regulation by changing present behavior.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper applies functional methods to law and economics to achieve higher efficiency in combating money laundering.

Findings

In this paper, it is found that the continuing of de-risking by financial institutions because of the avoidance strategy of money-laundering risks will inevitably result in further regulatory demands regarding the off-boarding process of clients. The legal basis for the introduction of further regulatory intervention is that some of the de-risking constitutes a direct contradiction to the aim of the present regulatory framework, making the behavior non-compliant to the regulation.

Originality/value

There has been very little research concerning de-risking related to money laundering. The present research has focused on the effect on society and not the relationship between the financial institutions and the regulator. This paper raises an important and present problem, as the behavior of the financial institutions constitute a response from the regulator that is contradicting the thoughts behind the behavior of the financial institutions. It is found that the paper is highly relevant if an expansion of regulation is to be hindered.

中文翻译：

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去风险化不合规行为迫使欧盟加强反洗钱监管

目的

最近的研究表明，由于洗钱风险，金融部门某些类型的公司客户的离职有所增加。这种被称为“去风险化”的现象被认为会对社会产生负面影响，因为它增加了洗钱的可能风险。本文的目的是分析金融机构的去风险策略是否会导致反洗钱监管框架的扩大，重点是客户的离场，如果是，是否有办法避免进一步的监管通过改变目前的行为。

设计/方法/方法

本文将函数方法应用于法律和经济学，以提高打击洗钱的效率。

发现

本文发现，金融机构因洗钱风险规避策略而持续去风险化，必然会导致对客户离场流程的进一步监管要求。引入进一步监管干预的法律依据是，一些去风险行为直接违背了现行监管框架的目标，使行为不符合监管规定。

原创性/价值

关于与洗钱相关的去风险化的研究很少。目前的研究侧重于对社会的影响，而不是金融机构与监管者之间的关系。本文提出了一个重要且当前的问题，因为金融机构的行为构成了监管机构的回应，与金融机构行为背后的思想相矛盾。研究发现，如果要阻碍监管的扩展，这篇论文是高度相关的。