Abstract

Contracts are frequently violated due to opportunism, misunderstandings, or external factors in construction projects. However, most previous studies focussed on how to prevent contract violations but little research has been conducted on responses to contract violations (i.e. enforcement practices) and the factors affecting these responses. Drawing on Attribution Theory, this study constructs a moderated mediating model of enforcement decisions, including contractual enforcement and relational enforcement, from contract violation, to trust and then to enforcement decisions, with the moderating role of legal enforceability. The findings from questionnaires show that compared with spirit violations, letter violations lead to lower trust and, thus, increase the severity of contractual enforcement and relational enforcement. Furthermore, trust exerts a more negative effect on contractual enforcement when legal enforceability is strong. Theoretically, this study provides a deeper understanding of enforcement decisions by incorporating contractual enforcement and relational enforcement, by differentiating types of contract violations, and by considering legal institutions. Practically, overly severe enforcement may lead to disputes and litigation and even endanger the profitable long-term relationship. This study provides guidelines for managers from the violating party to avert overly severe enforcement, and thus avoid high dispute resolution costs and facilitate long-term partnering.

摘要

在建设项目中，由于机会主义、误解或外部因素，合同经常被违反。然而，以前的大多数研究都集中在如何防止违反合同的问题上，但很少对违反合同的反应（即执法实践）以及影响这些反应的因素进行研究。本研究借鉴归因理论，构建了从合同违约到信任再到执法决策的执行决策的调节中介模型，包括合同执行和关系执行，具有法律可执行性的调节作用。问卷调查结果表明，与精神违反相比，信函违反导致信任度降低，从而增加了合同执行和关系执行的严重性。此外，当法律可执行性很强时，信任对合同的执行产生更大的负面影响。从理论上讲，本研究通过结合合同执行和关系执行、区分合同违规类型以及考虑法律制度，提供了对执行决策的更深入理解。实际上，过于严厉的执法可能会导致纠纷和诉讼，甚至危及有利可图的长期关系。本研究为违规方的管理人员提供指导，以避免过于严厉的执法，从而避免高昂的争议解决成本并促进长期合作。本研究通过将合同执行和关系执行结合起来，通过区分违反合同的类型以及考虑法律制度，对执行决定提供了更深入的理解。实际上，过于严厉的执法可能会导致纠纷和诉讼，甚至危及有利可图的长期关系。本研究为违规方的管理人员提供指导，以避免过于严厉的执法，从而避免高昂的争议解决成本并促进长期合作。本研究通过将合同执行和关系执行结合起来，通过区分违反合同的类型以及考虑法律制度，对执行决定提供了更深入的理解。实际上，过于严厉的执法可能会导致纠纷和诉讼，甚至危及有利可图的长期关系。本研究为违规方的管理人员提供指导，以避免过于严厉的执法，从而避免高昂的争议解决成本并促进长期合作。