The European Commission launched the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiatives in March 2020, which aimed to help European economic actors, including the fishing sector, to cope with the COVID-19 crisis. This initiative was translated into French law in April 2020, through a decree laying down conditions for obtaining temporary cessation subsidies. Here, we demonstrate that, in stark contradiction with the European Union's international commitments and binding objectives, France allocated this fund in a way that mostly benefited large-scale, high-impact fisheries. In particular, we show that seven companies/groups received 28.5% of all subsidies, for only 53 vessels, i.e. 0.8% of the French fleet. We also show that vessels smaller than 12 m and operating lower impact, 'passive' gears only accounted for 8.7% of subsidies although they account for 74.5% of the French fleet. In contrast, vessels larger than 12 m (and up to 89.4 m) and operating higher impact, 'active' gears captured 70.5% of all subsidies, although they only account for 10.7% of the fleet. These results support the fact that despite celebrated commitments and objectives aiming to support low impact, coastal communities and to rebuild thriving marine ecosystems — including during the COVID-19 crisis — a key fishing state such as France keeps implementing policies that are tailored by and for the most powerful companies and impactful fishing practices.

欧盟委员会于 2020 年 3 月启动了冠状病毒应对投资计划，旨在帮助包括渔业部门在内的欧洲经济参与者应对 COVID-19 危机。该倡议于 2020 年 4 月通过一项规定获得临时停止补贴的条件的法令转化为法国法律。在这里，我们证明，与欧盟的国际承诺和具有约束力的目标形成鲜明对比的是，法国以一种主要有利于大规模、高影响渔业的方式分配该基金。特别是，我们显示七家公司/集团获得了所有补贴的 28.5%，仅用于 53 艘船，即法国船队的 0.8%。我们还表明，小于 12 m 且运行冲击较小的船只，“被动”齿轮仅占 8 艘。7%的补贴，尽管它们占法国舰队的74.5%。相比之下，大于 12 m（最高 89.4 m）且运行影响更大的船舶，“主动”装置获得了所有补贴的 70.5%，尽管它们仅占船队的 10.7%。这些结果支持这样一个事实，即尽管有一些著名的承诺和目标旨在支持低影响的沿海社区和重建繁荣的海洋生态系统——包括在 COVID-19 危机期间——但像法国这样的主要捕鱼国仍在实施由其量身定制的政策。最强大的公司和有影响力的捕鱼方式。