Abstract

This article reconsiders scholarly indictments of Neville Chamberlain’s Mediterranean appeasement strategy. It explains why, out of several alternatives available, Chamberlain prioritized repairing cooperation with Benito Mussolini in the years following the Abyssinia Crisis. This article argues that Chamberlain ultimately decided to pursue an understanding with Italy because the British stood the most to gain from the Italian option. By the summer of 1937, Britain faced the possibility of war in Europe, the Far East, and the Mediterranean. Blocked from pursuing better relations with both the Germans and the Japanese, Chamberlain turned to reconcile relations with the Italians to relieve Britain’s strategic predicament. But an agreement with Italy also offered to strengthen Britain’s imperial position and make progress towards general appeasement. The debate that emerged between Neville Chamberlain and Anthony Eden over the direction of British foreign policy demonstrates that while the Foreign Secretary put forward a number of alternative policies, Chamberlain believed that the Italian option would best serve British interests. For too long, historians have pointed to Eden’s resignation as proof of Chamberlain’s failure to consider alternative policies without an adequate discussion of why he favoured an agreement with the Italians.

摘要

本文重新考虑了对内维尔·张伯伦地中海绥靖战略的学术指控。它解释了为什么张伯伦在阿比西尼亚危机后的几年里优先考虑修复与贝尼托墨索里尼的合作。本文认为，张伯伦最终决定与意大利达成谅解，因为英国人从意大利的选择中获益最多。到 1937 年夏天，英国面临在欧洲、远东和地中海发生战争的可能性。由于无法与德国人和日本人寻求更好的关系，张伯伦转而与意大利人调和关系以缓解英国的战略困境。但与意大利的一项协议也提出了加强英国的帝国地位并在全面绥靖方面取得进展。内维尔·张伯伦和安东尼·伊登之间出现的关于英国外交政策方向的辩论表明，虽然外交大臣提出了许多替代政策，但张伯伦认为意大利的选择最符合英国的利益。长期以来，历史学家一直将伊登的辞职视为张伯伦在没有充分讨论他为何赞成与意大利人达成协议的情况下未能考虑替代政策的证据。