Abstract

It is the task of this article to explore the status of experience within Jean-Luc Nancy’s exposition of freedom in order to discover his positioning of “the empirical” within philosophical discourse. It is my intention to (a) determine the coherence of the etymological work relating experience to the various manifestations of the sense of pir- (PIE base per-), (b) survey the role of “experience” in Nancy’s work on freedom, and (c) propose a reading of “the empirical” within Nancy’s work and, by extension, philosophical discourse generally. Interested in “the empirical” in philosophy, not empiricism as a philosophy, Nancy seeks to revise empiricist notions of experience and freedom by means of what he refers to as “empirico-transcendentalism.” I shall argue that, in raising empirical concepts (givenness, seizing, testing, self-evidence, factuality, etc.) up to a “transcendental” level of inquiry, Nancy’s “empirico-transcendentalism” bears no fruitful relationship with “classical empiricism” itself.

摘要

本文的任务是探索让-吕克·南希对自由的阐述中经验的地位，以发现他在哲学话语中“经验”的定位。我的目的是 (a) 确定与经验的各种表现相关的词源学工作的连贯性 (PIE base per-)，(b) 调查“经验”在南希关于自由的工作中的作用， (c) 建议对南希作品中的“经验”以及广义上的哲学话语进行解读。南希对哲学中的“经验”感兴趣，而不是作为哲学的经验主义，他试图通过他所谓的“经验-先验主义”来修正经验和自由的经验主义概念。我将争辩说，在提出经验概念（给予、夺取、检验、不证自明、事实性、