Abstract

This article argues that attempts by philosophy to think emotions as embodied is caught between the necessity of thinking them as a subjective first-person dimension of experience on the one hand and as an objective biological determination on the other. Philosophy has tended to view these two dimensions, qualitative and quantitative, respectively, as either in a parallelism with each other or alternatively has dispensed with either one or the other. This article draws on Georges Canguilhem’s biological thinking of “sense” as a mode of functional relationality that constitutes the being of organisms as such and brings it into a comparative alignment with Jean-Luc Nancy’s thinking of sense and touch. On this basis it argues that emotions are an extension of a more fundamental affectivity proper to biological life in general. This allows for the qualitative dimension of emotions and the objective knowledge of them in biology to be thought in an ontological continuity with each other. It also allows for a renewed thinking of the fundamental continuity of emotional and affective experience in human and non-human animal life.

摘要

本文认为，哲学将情感视为具身性的尝试被夹在一方面将它们视为主观的第一人称体验维度的必要性和另一方面作为客观的生物学决定之间。哲学倾向于将这两个维度分别视为定性和定量，或者彼此平行，或者放弃其中一个。本文借鉴 Georges Canguilhem 将“感觉”作为一种功能关系模式的生物学思想，该模式构成了有机体的存在，并将其与让-吕克·南希的感觉和触觉思想进行比较对齐。在此基础上，它认为情绪是普遍适用于生物生活的更基本情感的延伸。这允许情绪的定性维度和它们在生物学中的客观知识在彼此本体论的连续性中被思考。它还允许重新思考人类和非人类动物生活中情感和情感体验的基本连续性。