Many critics and defenders of P. F. Strawson's approach to moral responsibility in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ have attributed to Strawson a claim of psychological incapacity or impossibility with respect to our (in)ability to abandon or radically change the framework of reactive attitudes that constitute (at least) an important part of our responsibility practices. In this essay, I show that commentators have conflated two distinct arguments within Strawson's discussion in a way that increases his susceptibility to a challenge of empirical implausibility. I argue, further, that recognizing the difference between the two arguments has an additional important implication for Strawson's overall argument, as it reveals that his view involves two types of objectivity. I end by discussing some consequences for both broad applications of Strawson's moral psychology and narrow discussions within the free will literature.

中文翻译：

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无能、不可思议和两种客观性

PF Strawson 在《自由与怨恨》中对道德责任的态度的许多批评者和捍卫者将 Strawson 归因于我们（无法）放弃或彻底改变构成（在至少）我们责任实践的重要组成部分。在这篇文章中，我表明评论员在斯特劳森的讨论中将两个不同的论点混为一谈，这增加了他对经验不合理性挑战的敏感性。我进一步认为，认识到这两个论点之间的差异对斯特劳森的整体论点具有额外的重要意义，因为它揭示了他的观点涉及两种类型的客观性。