We develop a two-stage model to study the strategic interaction between a politician (the principal) and a bureaucrat (the agent) over the level of infrastructure provision with uncertainty about possible weather shocks. The bureaucrat chooses how much effort to contribute to infrastructure maintenance and the politician offers either a lump-sum wage (non-corrupt) contract or proportional bribe (corrupt) contract to induce effort. The degree of uncertainty about weather shocks, the size of the fixed wage, and the level of external monitoring to detect corruption all interact to affect (a) the politician's choice of contract and (b) whether this choice improves infrastructure outcomes. Our results suggest that curbing corruption is most likely to yield improvements in infrastructure provision when climate uncertainty is low and when bureaucratic wages are relatively high. If climate uncertainty is high, increasing monitoring has an unambiguous negative effect on infrastructure provision. Previous literature has focused either on public goods provision but not corruption or on bribery in a regulatory context that lacks public goods provision. We extend both literatures by analyzing how bribes between government officials affect a principal's ability to more effectively incentivize public goods provision by her agent.

中文翻译：

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运河、气候和腐败：不确定性下的公共基础设施供应

我们开发了一个两阶段模型来研究政治家（委托人）和官僚（代理人）在基础设施供应水平上的战略互动，并不确定可能的天气冲击。官僚选择为基础设施维护做出多少努力，而政治家则提供一次性工资（非腐败）合同或按比例贿赂（腐败）合同来诱导努力。天气冲击的不确定性程度、固定工资的规模以及检测腐败的外部监测水平都会相互作用，影响 (a) 政治家对合同的选择以及 (b) 这种选择是否会改善基础设施成果。我们的研究结果表明，当气候不确定性较低且官僚工资相对较高时，遏制腐败最有可能改善基础设施供应。如果气候不确定性很高，增加监测会对基础设施的供应产生明确的负面影响。以前的文献要么关注公共物品的提供而不是腐败，要么集中在缺乏公共物品提供的监管背景下的贿赂。我们通过分析政府官员之间的贿赂如何影响委托人更有效地激励其代理人提供公共产品的能力来扩展这两个文献。以前的文献要么关注公共物品的提供而不是腐败，要么集中在缺乏公共物品提供的监管背景下的贿赂。我们通过分析政府官员之间的贿赂如何影响委托人更有效地激励其代理人提供公共产品的能力来扩展这两个文献。以前的文献要么关注公共物品的提供而不是腐败，要么集中在缺乏公共物品提供的监管背景下的贿赂。我们通过分析政府官员之间的贿赂如何影响委托人更有效地激励其代理人提供公共产品的能力来扩展这两个文献。