With the rapid development of e-commerce, an increasing number of online travel agencies (OTA) have combined traditional channels with opaque channels to maximise revenue, by implementing a price-discrimination strategy. Based on posted-price (PP) mechanism, this study reviews variable opaque products (VOPs) that allow travellers to change the opacity of an opaque channel to avoid unsatisfactory hotels. The purpose of the study is to determine how to optimise OTA revenue. Using a variation of the Hotelling model, this study examines the behaviour of travellers whose reservation values are relatively low. Additionally, we determine the optimal pricing strategy, which changes with the opacity of the opaque channel. The study shows that when the proportion of high-value travellers is low, OTA should decrease the price of transparent hotels; however, when the proportion is high, OTA should set a high price in the traditional channel, so that high-value travellers buy in the traditional channel, while low-value travellers buy in the opaque channel. And when the valuations differ greatly, OTA tend to increase the price of transparent hotels. Finally, when the number of travellers is constant, revenue increases when hotels increase, though there is an upper limit, and revenue decreases when the market expands. The results provide significant implications.

随着电子商务的快速发展，越来越多的在线旅行社（OTA）将传统渠道与不透明渠道相结合，通过实施价格歧视策略来最大化收入。本研究基于公布价格 (PP) 机制，审查了可变不透明产品 (VOP)，这些产品允许旅行者改变不透明渠道的不透明度以避免不满意的酒店。该研究的目的是确定如何优化 OTA 收入。本研究使用 Hotelling 模型的变体，检查预订价值相对较低的旅行者的行为。此外，我们确定最佳定价策略，该策略随不透明通道的不透明度而变化。研究表明，当高价值旅客比例较低时，OTA应降低透明酒店的价格；然而，当占比高时，OTA应该在传统渠道设置高价，让高价值旅行者在传统渠道购买，而低价值旅行者在不透明渠道购买。而当估值差异较大时，OTA往往会抬高透明酒店的价格。最后，当游客数量不变时，酒店增加收入增加，但有上限，市场扩大收入减少。结果具有重要意义。酒店增加收入增加，但有上限，市场扩大收入减少。结果具有重要意义。酒店增加收入增加，但有上限，市场扩大收入减少。结果具有重要意义。