This study investigates the distortion of government disclosure on air pollution and further explores underlying political incentives that drive such distortion. We introduce a newly developed method, that is, bunching estimation based on notch points, to identify the distortion in the air pollution index disclosed by local governments. Results show that the magnitudes of distortion are significant and vary across cities. We present evidence that local politicians' promotion incentives substantially drive the distortion of environmental information. Importantly, we find that high-frequency disclosure requirements effectively discipline the behaviors of local governments because of increased manipulation costs. Overall, we contribute to the literature by identifying the distortion of government information disclosure, investigating the underlying causes, and examining the validity of new disclosure policies in shaping government behaviors.

本研究调查了政府对空气污染披露的扭曲，并进一步探讨了导致这种扭曲的潜在政治动机。我们引入了一种新开发的方法，即基于缺口点的聚类估计，以识别地方政府公开的空气污染指数的失真。结果表明，失真的幅度很大，并且因城市而异。我们提供的证据表明，当地政客的晋升激励在很大程度上推动了环境信息的扭曲。重要的是，我们发现，由于操纵成本的增加，高频披露要求有效地约束了地方政府的行为。总体而言，我们通过识别政府信息披露的扭曲对文献做出贡献，