Due to the supply chain globalization, technology-oriented original equipment manufacturers are focusing on their core competencies by outsourcing the production to contract manufacturers. Many contract manufacturers also engage in remanufacturing and provide high quality remanufactured products in the market posing competition to the new products. This paper considers a supply chain with an original equipment manufacturer and a contract manufacturer. The contract manufacturer produces new products for the original equipment manufacturer and may compete with the original equipment manufacturer by producing and selling remanufactured products. The original equipment manufacturer can determine whether to authorize the contract manufacturer's remanufacturing. This paper investigates the wholesale price and retail price decisions for the new product and the conditions under which an authorization agreement can be reached between the two parties. In the analysis, two wholesale price settings are considered, the exogenous wholesale and endogenous wholesale price settings. In addition, three authorization decision bargaining scenarios are examined, including the original equipment manufacturer determining the authorization fee, the contract manufacturer determining the authorization fee, and two parties negotiating the authorization fee, to analyze the authorization cooperation outcomes via the generalized Nash bargaining framework. The results show that when the contract manufacturer determines the authorization fee, an authorization cooperation can never be reached whether in the exogenous or endogenous wholesale price setting. The original equipment manufacturer is more likely to set an authorization fee that leads to an authorization cooperation between the original equipment manufacturer and the contract manufacturer, especially when the contract manufacturer collects and remanufactures all the used products. Multiple factors influencing authorization cooperation decision are investigated, including the exogenous and endogenous wholesale price, production cost of new and remanufactured products, bargaining power of the two parties, and consumers' preference for remanufactured products.

由于供应链全球化，以技术为导向的原始设备制造商通过将生产外包给合同制造商来专注于他们的核心竞争力。许多合约制造商也从事再制造，并在市场上提供高质量的再制造产品，对新产品构成竞争。本文考虑具有原始设备制造商和合同制造商的供应链。合同制造商为原始设备制造商生产新产品，并可以通过生产和销售再制造产品与原始设备制造商竞争。原始设备制造商可以决定是否授权合同制造商进行再制造。本文研究了新产品的批发价和零售价决策以及双方达成授权协议的条件。在分析中，考虑了两种批发价格设置，外生批发价格设置和内生批发价格设置。此外，还考察了原始设备制造商确定授权费、合同制造商确定授权费和两方协商授权费三种授权决策谈判场景，通过广义纳什谈判框架分析授权合作结果。结果表明，当合同制造商确定授权费时，无论是外生还是内生的批发价格设置，都永远无法达成授权合作。原始设备制造商更有可能设置授权费，导致原始设备制造商与合同制造商之间进行授权合作，特别是当合同制造商收集并再制造所有使用过的产品时。考察了影响授权合作决策的多个因素，包括外源和内源批发价格、新产品和再制造产品的生产成本、双方的议价能力以及消费者对再制造产品的偏好。原始设备制造商更有可能设置授权费，导致原始设备制造商与合同制造商之间进行授权合作，特别是当合同制造商收集并再制造所有使用过的产品时。考察了影响授权合作决策的多个因素，包括外源和内源批发价格、新产品和再制造产品的生产成本、双方的议价能力以及消费者对再制造产品的偏好。原始设备制造商更有可能设置授权费，导致原始设备制造商与合同制造商之间进行授权合作，特别是当合同制造商收集并再制造所有使用过的产品时。考察了影响授权合作决策的多个因素，包括外源和内源批发价格、新产品和再制造产品的生产成本、双方的议价能力以及消费者对再制造产品的偏好。