In our model where career concerns take the form of promotion, managers use projects and effort to influence the labor market beliefs regarding their ability. We show that managers consider how projects affect the extent to which posterior beliefs can differ from initial beliefs, the precision of posterior beliefs, and equilibrium implementation effort costs. The following results obtain. Although projects differ only in terms of the information they reveal, equilibrium implementation effort costs can reverse project choices. More informative projects can induce lower effort despite the learning effect identified by Holmströmm's paper (1999). Regardless of the attractiveness of promotion, equilibrium effort is insufficient at either end of the reputation distribution. Finally, good (respectively, bad) reputation managers sometimes choose the more informative (respectively, less informative) project.

中文翻译：

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晋升、管理项目选择和实施工作

在我们的职业关注采取晋升形式的模型中，管理人员使用项目和努力来影响劳动力市场对其能力的信念。我们表明，管理人员会考虑项目如何影响后验信念与初始信念的差异程度、后验信念的精确度以及均衡实施的努力成本。得到以下结果。尽管项目仅在它们揭示的信息方面有所不同，但均衡的实施工作成本可以逆转项目选择。尽管 Holmströmm 的论文 (1999) 确定了学习效果，但更多的信息项目可以减少努力。不管晋升的吸引力如何，在声誉分布的两端均衡努力是不够的。最后，好（分别，