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Subsidy or minimum requirement? Regulation of port adaptation investment under disaster ambiguity
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological ( IF 5.8 ) Pub Date : 2021-07-14 , DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2021.04.006
Shiyuan Zheng 1 , Kun Wang 2 , Zhi-Chun Li 3 , Xiaowen Fu 4 , Felix T.S. Chan 4
Affiliation  

This paper models two commonly adopted regulatory polices (the minimum requirement regulation vs. subsidy) on port adaptation investment to mitigate the damage caused by climate change-related disasters. The ambiguity of the disaster occurrence probability and the decision makers’ attitudes towards risk are explicitly modelled. It is found, under the minimum requirement regulation, ports balance the option of increasing their adaptation vs. reducing their economic activities. In comparison, subsidies promote adaptation without introducing any incentive for ports to reduce outputs, but they can be less efficient than minimum requirement regulations in addressing market failures, such as that caused by a spill-over externality. The ambiguity of disasters changes the optimal designs of minimum requirement regulation and subsidy policy but does not change their relative ranking qualitatively. Decision makers’ risk attitudes also play important roles. Higher degrees of pessimism (more risk aversion) lead to lower port outputs but can also increase the level of port adaptation to achieve full insurance against disaster loss. Higher degrees of pessimism also make the government more conservative to intervene in the ports’ adaptation and thus less likely to impose the two regulatory policies. Our analysis also explains why it is justified for the government to withhold intervention under ambiguity, and also shows that the ambiguity does not necessarily bring worse expected social welfare.



中文翻译:

补贴或最低要求?灾害模糊条件下港口适应投资规制

本文模拟了两种常用的港口适应投资监管政策(最低要求监管与补贴),以减轻气候变化相关灾害造成的损害。灾害发生概率的模糊性和决策者对风险的态度被明确建模。发现,在最低要求法规下,港口平衡了增加适应与减少经济活动的选择。相比之下,补贴促进适应而不为港口减少产出引入任何激励措施,但在解决市场失灵(例如由溢出外部性引起的失灵)方面,它们的效率可能低于最低要求法规。灾害的模糊性改变了最低要求监管和补贴政策的优化设计,但不会从质上改变它们的相对排名。决策者的风险态度也起着重要作用。更高的悲观程度(更多的风险规避)导致更低的港口产出,但也可以提高港口适应水平,以实现对灾害损失的全面保险。更高程度的悲观情绪也使政府在干预港口适应方面更加保守,因此不太可能实施这两项监管政策。我们的分析还解释了为什么政府在含糊不清的情况下拒绝干预是合理的,并且还表明含糊不清并不一定会带来更糟糕的预期社会福利。决策者的风险态度也起着重要作用。更高的悲观程度(更多的风险规避)导致更低的港口产出,但也可以提高港口适应水平,以实现对灾害损失的全面保险。更高程度的悲观情绪也使政府在干预港口适应方面更加保守,因此不太可能实施这两项监管政策。我们的分析还解释了为什么政府在含糊不清的情况下拒绝干预是合理的,并且还表明含糊不清并不一定会带来更糟糕的预期社会福利。决策者的风险态度也起着重要作用。更高的悲观程度(更多的风险规避)导致更低的港口产出,但也可以提高港口适应水平,以实现对灾害损失的全面保险。更高程度的悲观情绪也使政府在干预港口适应方面更加保守,因此不太可能实施这两项监管政策。我们的分析还解释了为什么政府在含糊不清的情况下拒绝干预是合理的,并且还表明含糊不清并不一定会带来更糟糕的预期社会福利。更高程度的悲观情绪也使政府在干预港口适应方面更加保守,因此不太可能实施这两项监管政策。我们的分析还解释了为什么政府在含糊不清的情况下拒绝干预是合理的,并且还表明含糊不清并不一定会带来更糟糕的预期社会福利。更高程度的悲观情绪也使政府在干预港口适应方面更加保守,因此不太可能实施这两项监管政策。我们的分析还解释了为什么政府在含糊不清的情况下拒绝干预是合理的,并且还表明含糊不清并不一定会带来更糟糕的预期社会福利。

更新日期:2021-07-14
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