Abstract

This study sheds new light on nuclear risk governance from a sociological perspective by analyzing cases of post-Fukushima controversies on nuclear safety and nuclear emergency preparedness in Japan. By critically analyzing how the three risk-related concepts and methodologies, namely, probabilistic risk assessment, safety goals, and the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information, have been interpreted, implemented, and/or abandoned before and after the Fukushima accident, this study identifies three common features that characterize Japan’s nuclear risk governance: avoiding critical conflicts, proclivity toward automated decision making, and strategic overlooking of “uncomfortable knowledge.” These features all involve ignorance of the dynamic nature of safety where addressing uncertainties, heterogeneous knowledge, and incommensurable values can be key for continuously reviewing the existing edifice of safety. By elucidating why such ignorance persists in Japan despite the post-accidental drastic reform, the authors both articulate the deep-rooted structure that underlies it and reflects the societal and historical context, and eventually conceptualize this ignorance as “structural ignorance” of expertise in nuclear safety controversies and policy processes. The results also provide direction for further research to solve this structural problem.

摘要

本研究通过分析福岛核事故后日本有关核安全和核应急准备的争议案例，从社会学的角度为核风险治理提供了新的视角。通过批判性分析三个与风险相关的概念和方法，即概率风险评估、安全目标和环境应急剂量信息预测系统，在福岛事故前后是如何被解释、实施和/或放弃的，本研究确定了日本核风险治理的三个共同特征：避免重大冲突、倾向于自动化决策以及战略性地忽视“不舒服的知识”。这些特征都涉及对处理不确定性、异构知识、不可通约的价值可能是持续审查现有安全体系的关键。通过阐明为什么尽管发生了意外后的剧烈改革，这种无知仍然存在于日本，作者们阐明了其背后的根深蒂固的结构并反映了社会和历史背景，并最终将这种无知概念化为对核专业知识的“结构性无知”安全争议和政策流程。研究结果也为进一步研究解决这一结构问题提供了方向。并最终将这种无知概念化为对核安全争议和政策程序专业知识的“结构性无知”。研究结果也为进一步研究解决这一结构问题提供了方向。并最终将这种无知概念化为对核安全争议和政策程序专业知识的“结构性无知”。研究结果也为进一步研究解决这一结构问题提供了方向。