The Constitution’s division of powers from which E. Corwin famously asserted an “invitation to struggle” in the making of US foreign policy (1957, 171) has become overshadowed by partisan conflict in the contemporary era. Although much of the extant literature points to Congress’s subsidiary role in foreign policy relative to the presidency-centered model, the appeal of partisanship has worked to further deepen congressional abrogation and extend presidential unilateralism (Lindsay in Congress and the politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1994; Kriner in After the rubicon: congress, presidents, and the politics of waging war. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2010; Potter in Pres Stud Quart 46(4):849–867, 2016). Our analysis illustrates a puzzle. On one hand, there are growing levels of majority support in the USA for political leadership on the world stage. But on the other hand, our analysis of congressional behavior such as voting, lawmaking, and oversight shows relatively clear patterns of congressional decline—Congress no longer exercises much of its power in foreign affairs, neither in form or substance. Partisan incentives for congressional abdication to the presidency carry at least one additional risk we point to: Congressional capitulation from its constitutional duty places democracy in the jeopardy that the Framers’ design was intended to prevent.

E. Corwin 在制定美国外交政策（1957 年，第 171 年）时曾以“斗争邀请”着称的宪法权力分工已被当代党派冲突所掩盖。尽管现有的许多文献都指出，相对于以总统为中心的模式，国会在外交政策中的辅助作用，党派之争进一步加深了国会的废除并扩大了总统单边主义（林赛在国会和美国外交政策中的政治）。约翰霍普金斯大学出版社，巴尔的摩，1994 年；Kriner 于 rubicon 之后：国会、总统和发动战争的政治。芝加哥大学出版社，芝加哥，2010 年；Potter in Pres Stud Quart 46(4):849–867, 2016 ）。我们的分析说明了一个难题。一方面，美国在世界舞台上对政治领导地位的支持越来越多。但另一方面，我们对投票、立法和监督等国会行为的分析表明，国会衰落的模式相对清晰——国会不再在外交事务中行使大部分权力，无论是形式还是实质。我们指出，国会退位总统职位的党派激励至少带来了一个额外的风险：国会从其宪法职责中投降将民主置于危险之中，而制宪者的设计旨在防止这种危险。监督显示出国会衰落的相对明显模式——国会不再在外交事务中行使大部分权力，无论是形式还是实质。我们指出，国会退位总统职位的党派激励至少带来了一个额外的风险：国会从其宪法职责中投降将民主置于危险之中，而制宪者的设计旨在防止这种危险。监督显示出国会衰落的相对明显模式——国会不再在外交事务中行使大部分权力，无论是形式还是实质。我们指出，国会退位总统职位的党派激励至少带来了一个额外的风险：国会从其宪法职责中投降将民主置于危险之中，而制宪者的设计旨在防止这种危险。