IN A Radical Pluralist Philosophy of Religion, Mikel Burley proposes a model of philosophy of religion that does not include the evaluation of religious truth claims as one of its tasks. On what he calls a “contemplative” model of philosophy of religion, philosophers, like most anthropologists and historians of religion, eschew arguing for or against their objects of study. Instead, they seek “simply” to elucidate the meaning of religious practices as possibilities for how human beings can intelligibly live their lives. Burley contrasts this descriptive approach with the two-task model of philosophy of religion that I have recommended (Schilbrack 2014), which includes both description and the evaluation of reasons that can be given for or against a religious practice, belief, experience, or institution. A non-evaluative model of philosophy such as Burley’s may be appealing to those who hold that the academic study of religions, in contrast to religious or theological approaches, should not be in the business of advocating for or against particular religious views. Comparing his approach and mine can therefore serve as a kind of bellwether for discussions about normativity in the academic study of religions. In this short essay, I clarify the differences between these two approaches and argue that the evaluative task also belongs in the academic study of religions.

中文翻译：

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后殖民宗教哲学中的批判与评价

在激进的多元宗教哲学中，Mikel Burley 提出了一种宗教哲学模型，该模型不包括对宗教真理主张的评估作为其任务之一。在他所谓的宗教哲学的“沉思”模型上，哲学家，就像大多数人类学家和宗教历史学家一样，避免争论支持或反对他们的研究对象。相反，他们寻求“简单地”阐明宗教实践的意义，作为人类如何明智地生活的可能性。Burley 将这种描述性方法与我推荐的宗教哲学的双任务模型进行了对比（Schilbrack 2014），其中包括对支持或反对宗教实践、信仰、经验或制度的理由的描述和评估. 像 Burley 的非评价性哲学模型可能会吸引那些认为与宗教或神学方法相反的宗教学术研究不应该从事倡导或反对特定宗教观点的业务的人。因此，将他的方法与我的方法进行比较，可以作为宗教学术研究中关于规范性讨论的风向标。在这篇短文中，我澄清了这两种方法之间的差异，并认为评估任务也属于宗教的学术研究。因此，将他的方法与我的方法进行比较，可以作为宗教学术研究中关于规范性讨论的风向标。在这篇短文中，我澄清了这两种方法之间的差异，并认为评估任务也属于宗教的学术研究。因此，将他的方法与我的方法进行比较，可以作为宗教学术研究中关于规范性讨论的风向标。在这篇短文中，我澄清了这两种方法之间的差异，并认为评估任务也属于宗教的学术研究。