This paper argues that Daniel Ellsberg regarded the urn examples and conception of ambiguity presented in his famous 1961 paper as merely a step towards the analysis of more fundamental forms of uncertainty. Drawing on what is known about Ellsberg’s activities during the 1950s and early 1960s, it is shown that, after starting his project as one of reviving Frank Knight’s ideas about uncertainty, Ellsberg went on to realise that his position was in fact rather closer to that of John Maynard Keynes in his A Treatise on Probability. Furthermore, it is shown that formerly classified research Ellsberg undertook in the early 1960s also reveals an abiding influence in fundamental uncertainty.

中文翻译：

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从奈特主义到凯恩斯主义的不确定性：将埃尔斯伯格的模糊性语境化

本文认为，丹尼尔·埃尔斯伯格（Daniel Ellsberg）认为他在 1961 年著名的论文中提出的瓮例子和歧义概念仅仅是朝着分析更基本的不确定性形式迈出的一步。根据对埃尔斯伯格在 1950 年代和 1960 年代初期活动的了解，研究表明，在开始他的项目作为复兴弗兰克奈特关于不确定性的想法之一之后，埃尔斯伯格继续意识到他的立场实际上更接近于约翰梅纳德凯恩斯在他的《概率论》中。此外，显示埃尔斯伯格在 1960 年代初期进行的以前的机密研究也揭示了对基本不确定性的持久影响。