John Maynard Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability is the seminal text for the logical interpretation of probability. According to his analysis, probabilities are evidential relations between a hypothesis and some evidence, just like the relations of deductive logic. While some philosophers had suggested similar ideas prior to Keynes, it was not until his Treatise that the logical interpretation of probability was advocated in a clear, systematic and rigorous way. I trace Keynes’s influence in the philosophy of probability through a heterogeneous sample of thinkers who adopted his interpretation. This sample consists of Frederick C. Benenson, Roy Harrod, Donald C. Williams, Henry E. Kyburg and David Stove. The ideas of Keynes prove to be adaptable to their diverse theories of probability. My discussion indicates both the robustness of Keynes’s probability theory and the importance of its influence on the philosophers whom I describe. I also discuss the Problem of the Priors. I argue that none of those I discuss have obviously improved on Keynes’s theory with respect to this issue.

中文翻译：

---

概率和论证：凯恩斯的遗产

约翰梅纳德凯恩斯的《概率论》是概率逻辑解释的开创性文本。根据他的分析，概率是一个假设和一些证据之间的证据关系，就像演绎逻辑的关系一样。虽然在凯恩斯之前，一些哲学家提出了类似的观点，但直到他的论文，概率的逻辑解释才以清晰、系统和严谨的方式被提倡。我通过采用他的解释的思想家的异质样本来追溯凯恩斯对概率哲学的影响。该样本由 Frederick C. Benenson、Roy Harrod、Donald C. Williams、Henry E. Kyburg 和 David Stove 组成。凯恩斯的思想被证明适用于他们不同的概率理论。我的讨论既表明了凯恩斯概率论的稳健性，也表明了它对我所描述的哲学家的影响的重要性。我还讨论了先验问题。我认为我所讨论的这些都没有明显改进凯恩斯在这个问题上的理论。