The implementation of International Maritime Organization (IMO) 2020 sulfur cap requires ship operators to decrease fuels’ sulfur content and this may increase their demand for low-sulfur fuel (LSF). In anticipation, bunker companies can choose to upgrade their refining technology to produce better quality distillate and lighter oil. In this study, we consider a bunker supply chain consisting of bunker companies and a population of ship operators with two main marine fuel products, low-sulfur fuel (LSF) and high-sulfur fuel (HSF). We use Cournot game to model the competition between LSF and HSF under two different market channels (i.e., dual and single channels). The results show that bunker companies’ refining technology upgrading choice is affected by many operational parameters, such as the basic market demand, cost difference between LSF and HSF, market competition, variable and fixed cost for upgrading, the increase of market demand due to upgrading, and so on. Compared with a dual channel bunker company, a single channel bunker company is less likely to implement new refining technology. We further consider the scenario where bunker companies can make decisions after the realization of ship operators’ demand uncertainty. The findings are beneficial for both LSF and HSF bunker companies and may reach a win-win solution for bunker companies.

国际海事组织 (IMO) 2020 硫含量上限的实施要求船舶运营商降低燃料的硫含量，这可能会增加他们对低硫燃料 (LSF) 的需求。预计，燃料公司可以选择升级其炼油技术，以生产质量更好的馏分油和轻油。在本研究中，我们考虑了一个由燃料公司和船舶运营商组成的燃料供应链，它们拥有两种主要的船用燃料产品，低硫燃料 (LSF) 和高硫燃料 (HSF)。我们使用古诺博弈对两种不同市场渠道（即双渠道和单渠道）下 LSF 和 HSF 之间的竞争进行建模。结果表明，燃油企业的炼油技术升级选择受基本市场需求、LSF和HSF的成本差异、市场竞争、升级的可变和固定成本、升级导致的市场需求增加等。与双通道燃料公司相比，单通道燃料公司不太可能实施新的炼油技术。我们进一步考虑了在船舶运营商需求不确定性实现后燃料公司可以做出决策的场景。研究结果对 LSF 和 HSF 燃油公司都有利，并可能为燃油公司达成双赢的解决方案。我们进一步考虑了在船舶运营商需求不确定性实现后燃料公司可以做出决策的场景。研究结果对 LSF 和 HSF 燃油公司都有利，并可能为燃油公司达成双赢的解决方案。我们进一步考虑了在船舶运营商需求不确定性实现后燃料公司可以做出决策的场景。研究结果对 LSF 和 HSF 燃油公司都有利，并可能为燃油公司达成双赢的解决方案。