ABSTRACT

Patent pricing is the core issue in patent industrialisation. This paper uses game theory to study the effects of auction behaviours when the members of the patent portfolio are auctioned either together or separately. A comparison of patent product yields the results (1) the outputs of a patented product are lower in a packaged auction than in a separate auction, and the outputs of the two auction modes decrease as the correlation between patent members increases; (2) the profits of package portfolios are higher under packaged auctions than under separate auctions, and an enterprise's profit is negatively related to the correlation between the patent members; (3) when a patent portfolio is subjected to separate auction, the product outputs under Stackelberg equilibrium in a game are higher than that under static equilibrium, and the product outputs in the Stackelberg equilibrium decrease with the correlation between patent members; and (4) when the members of a patent portfolio are auctioned separately, the profits in the Stackelberg equilibrium and static equilibrium are related to the correlation between patent portfolio members; the profits in the Stackelberg equilibrium will first decrease and then increase as the correlation between patent portfolio members increases.

摘要

专利定价是专利产业化的核心问题。本文运用博弈论研究专利组合的成员被一起拍卖或单独拍卖时拍卖行为的影响。专利产品比较得出的结果（1）专利产品在打包拍卖中的产出低于单独拍卖，两种拍卖模式的产出随着专利成员之间相关性的增加而降低；（2）组合拍卖的组合收益高于单独拍卖，企业收益与专利成员之间的相关性呈负相关；(3) 当专利组合进行单独拍卖时，博弈中Stackelberg均衡下的产品产出高于静态均衡下的产品产出，Stackelberg均衡中的产品产出随着专利成员之间的相关性而降低；(4)当专利组合的成员被单独拍卖时，Stackelberg均衡和静态均衡中的利润与专利组合成员之间的相关性有关；Stackelberg 均衡中的利润将随着专利组合成员之间的相关性增加而先减少后增加。