ABSTRACT

This study introduces vertical pay dispersion, a prevailing equity issue in discussions of organizations and society, to public management research. Bridging tournament and equity theory with the publicness debate, the study analyses the role of publicness dimensions —ownership, funding, and control— for manager-to-worker pay ratios of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The results show that, for a unique five-year data set, ownership publicness partly affects vertical pay dispersion, and the effects are moderated by city and SOE size. The study enhances the understanding of vertical pay dispersion in the public sector and offers a research agenda regarding the determinants.

摘要

本研究将纵向薪酬分散这一在组织和社会讨论中普遍存在的公平问题引入公共管理研究。该研究将锦标赛和公平理论与公共性辩论联系起来，分析了公共性维度（所有权、资金和控制）对国有企业 (SOE) 经理与工人薪酬比率的作用。结果表明，对于一个独特的 5 年数据集，所有权公开性部分地影响了纵向薪酬分散，并且该影响受到城市和国有企业规模的调节。该研究加强了对公共部门纵向薪酬分散的理解，并提供了有关决定因素的研究议程。