I examine the effects of information asymmetry–driven mispricing on security issuance. Using predisclosure changes in purchase obligations as a proxy for information asymmetry–driven mispricing, I find that managers avoid (prefer) issuing securities when they perceive their firms to be undervalued (overvalued). The effects of information asymmetry–driven mispricing are stronger on equity issuance than debt issuance. Consequently, undervaluation (overvaluation) causes an increase (decrease) in leverage. These effects are more pronounced for firms, periods, and securities associated with greater information asymmetry. The stock-trading patterns that managers follow suggest that their perceived mispricing is an important factor in both private and firm-level decisions.

中文翻译：

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信息不对称、错误定价和安全发行

我研究了信息不对称驱动的错误定价对证券发行的影响。使用购买义务的披露前变化作为信息不对称驱动的错误定价的代理，我发现当管理者认为他们的公司被低估（高估）时，他们会避免（更喜欢）发行证券。信息不对称驱动的错误定价对股票发行的影响比债券发行更强。因此，低估（高估）导致杠杆增加（减少）。对于与更大信息不对称相关的公司、时期和证券，这些影响更为明显。管理者遵循的股票交易模式表明，他们感知到的错误定价是私人和公司决策的重要因素。