Once a popular tool to estimate welfare changes, the money metric of McKenzie-Samuelson gradually faded from use after welfare theorists and practitioners argued that it led to inegalitarian recommendations. We prove that, at a competitive equilibrium price, any associated competitive allocation maximizes the money-metric sum; and, as is well understood, competitive allocations can be egalitarian or inegalitarian. The result applies to economies in which individual demand is not rationalizable by any binary relation, let alone a binary relation representable by a utility function, a behavioral setting considered, for example, in Bernheim–Rangel.

中文翻译：

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应用福利分析中的货币指标：鞍点康复

McKenzie-Samuelson 的货币指标曾经是估计福利变化的流行工具，但在福利理论家和实践者认为它导致了不平等的建议之后，它逐渐不再使用。我们证明，在竞争性均衡价格下，任何相关的竞争性分配都会使货币度量总和最大化；而且，众所周知，竞争性分配可以是平等的或不平等的。该结果适用于个人需求不能通过任何二元关系合理化的经济体，更不用说由效用函数表示的二元关系，例如在 Bernheim-Rangel 中考虑的行为设置。