Abstract

This study explores municipal cost behavior during periods of financial crisis and strict financial sustainability legislation. The study employees Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman approach on a data sample of 48,096 observations from Spanish municipalities for the period 2008-2018. The results suggest that during this period municipality total, service provision and investment expenses exhibit anti-sticky behavior; that is the cost response to an activity level decrease is greater than its response in the case of an activity increase. After the adoption of the financial sustainability legislation this behavior is more intense for all expense categories. Moreover, in periods preceding elections the anti-stickiness trend is mitigated, while size appears to play a role as well, with larger municipalities showing greater anti-stickiness. Eventually, it appears that resource adjustment motivations during crisis periods, under law enforcement and before elections, play a key role in municipal asymmetric cost behavior.

摘要

本研究探讨了金融危机和严格的财务可持续性立法期间的市政成本行为。该研究员工 Anderson、Banker 和 Janakiraman 对 2008-2018 年期间西班牙城市的 48,096 次观察数据样本进行了处理。结果表明，在此期间，市政总、服务提供和投资费用表现出反粘性行为；也就是说，对活动水平降低的成本响应大于其在活动增加的情况下的响应。在通过财务可持续性立法后，这种行为对于所有费用类别都更加强烈。此外，在选举前的时期，反粘性趋势有所缓解，而规模似乎也发挥了作用，较大的城市表现出更大的反粘性。最终，