Abstract

This study investigates the relationship between founder-led firms and non-securities (operational) litigation risk. We postulate lower operational litigation risk for founder-led firms than for nonfounder-led firms based on founder-CEOs’ limited agency conflicts and stronger emotional attachment to the firms they establish. Our empirical results suggest that having a founder as CEO mitigates the risk of being involved in operational lawsuits that could result in substantial financial losses and long-lasting negative consequences.

中文翻译：

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创始人领导的公司和运营诉讼风险

摘要

本研究调查了创始人领导的公司与非证券（运营）诉讼风险之间的关系。我们假设创始人领导的公司的运营诉讼风险低于非创始人领导的公司，这是基于创始人-CEO 有限的代理冲突和对他们建立的公司更强烈的情感依恋。我们的实证结果表明，让创始人担任 CEO 可以降低卷入可能导致重大财务损失和长期负面后果的运营诉讼的风险。