In this essay, I raise a puzzle concerning rational emotions. The puzzle arises from the fact that a handful of very plausible claims seem to commit us to the idea that whether a subject ought to have a certain emotion at a given time in part depends on the fittingness of the intensity of the feelings it involves, and the fittingness of these feelings in part depends on the intensity of the feelings the subject has at that time. Yet this idea is incompatible with another plausible claim: namely, that the deontic properties possessed by a subject having an emotion with a certain intensity are not counterfactually dependent on her having that emotion with that intensity.

在这篇文章中，我提出了一个关于理性情绪的谜题。谜题源于这样一个事实，即一些非常合理的主张似乎使我们相信一个主题是否应该在给定时间拥有某种情绪部分取决于它所涉及的感受强度的适合性，以及这些感觉的适合程度部分取决于受试者当时的感觉强度。然而，这个想法与另一个似是而非的主张不相容：即，具有某种强度情绪的主体所拥有的道义属性并不反事实地依赖于她具有这种强度的情绪。