Fear of escalating input prices in response to retail success is a commonly-discussed phenomenon affecting supply chains. Such a ratchet effect arises when a retailer feels compelled to modify his investments to better serve the end customers in order to hide positive prospects and restrain future wholesale price hikes. In a two-period model of supply chain interactions, the authors demonstrate that such an endogenous ratchet effect can have multi-faceted reverberations. A retailer fearing price hikes may be tempted to curtail near-term profits to ensure favorable long-term pricing. In response, the supplier can use deep discounts in its initial wholesale prices to convince the retailer to focus on its short-run profits rather than long-run pricing concerns. These deep discounts not only encourage mutually beneficial investments but also alleviate double-marginalization inefficiencies along the supply chain. In light of these results, the authors demonstrate that the mandatory information disclosure policy to reduce the ratchet effect decreases total channel efficiency compared to the case without information disclosure, precisely because mandatory disclosure interrupts the healthy tension among supply chain partners. Thus, the model presents a scenario where ratcheting concerns can create a degree of self-enforcing cooperation that results in socially beneficial responses in supply chains.

害怕因零售成功而导致投入品价格上涨是影响供应链的普遍讨论现象。当零售商感到有必要调整其投资以更好地服务于最终客户以隐藏积极的前景并抑制未来批发价格上涨时，就会出现这种棘轮效应。在供应链相互作用的两期模型中，作者证明了这种内生棘轮效应可以产生多方面的影响。担心价格上涨的零售商可能会试图削减近期利润以确保有利的长期定价。作为回应，供应商可以使用初始批发价格的大幅折扣来说服零售商关注其短期利润而不是长期定价问题。这些大幅折扣不仅鼓励互利投资，而且还缓解了供应链上的双重边缘化低效率。鉴于这些结果，作者证明，与没有信息披露的情况相比，减少棘轮效应的强制信息披露政策降低了总渠道效率，正是因为强制披露中断了供应链合作伙伴之间的健康紧张关系。因此，该模型呈现了一个场景，其中棘轮关注可以创建一定程度的自我强化合作，从而在供应链中产生对社会有益的响应。作者证明，与没有信息披露的情况相比，减少棘轮效应的强制性信息披露政策降低了总渠道效率，正是因为强制性信息披露中断了供应链合作伙伴之间的健康紧张关系。因此，该模型呈现了一个场景，其中棘轮关注可以创建一定程度的自我强化合作，从而在供应链中产生对社会有益的响应。作者证明，与没有信息披露的情况相比，减少棘轮效应的强制性信息披露政策降低了总渠道效率，正是因为强制性信息披露中断了供应链合作伙伴之间的健康紧张关系。因此，该模型呈现了一个场景，其中棘轮关注可以创建一定程度的自我强化合作，从而在供应链中产生对社会有益的响应。