A standard incomplete-information war of attrition is extended to incorporate experimentation. We obtain a characterization of all equilibria in this extended setup and use this setup to illuminate a tradeoff between short-run and long-run gains of experimentation. The extension yields qualitative impacts on the strategic nature of the problem. The option value of experimentation serves as a credible commitment device to stay in the game, which is instrumental in inducing the other player to concede earlier. As a direct consequence, there may be an equilibrium in which the strictly less efficient player, but with a higher margin of experimentation, can get the better end of the deal. This result leads to an important empirical implication since the margin of experimentation is not directly observable, even ex post. Our analysis also gives insight into why an apparently inferior technology often survives in standards competitions and more broadly offers implications for technology adoption and industry dynamics.

中文翻译：

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与试验玩家的消耗战*

标准的不完全信息消耗战被扩展到包含实验。我们在此扩展设置中获得了所有均衡的特征，并使用此设置来阐明短期和长期实验收益之间的权衡。扩展对问题的战略性质产生定性影响。实验的期权价值作为一种可信的承诺机制来留在游戏中，这有助于诱导其他玩家提前让步。作为一个直接的结果，可能会出现一种平衡，在这种平衡中，严格来说效率较低的参与者，但具有更高的实验余地，可以获得更好的交易结果。这个结果导致了一个重要的经验含义，因为实验的边际不能直接观察到，即使是事后. 我们的分析还深入了解了为什么明显劣质的技术经常在标准竞争中幸存下来，并且更广泛地为技术采用和行业动态提供了启示。