Mixed-bundling of groceries and gasoline is common, but it raises ‘predatory’ concerns. This paper extends the standard Hotelling approach to consider bundled discounts when two conglomerates and an independent gasoline retailer compete. We show that bundling may result in exit and analyze the effects of capping discounts—a regulatory solution adopted in Australia. The optimal cap depends on the regulator’s objective and the potential for exit. When unregulated discounting leads to exit, an intermediate cap maximises consumer surplus. A cap also ensures that no consumer is worse off with the discounts, an outcome that does not occur with unregulated discounts.

中文翻译：

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封顶捆绑折扣：两个监管理由*

杂货和汽油的混合捆绑很常见，但这引起了“掠夺性”的担忧。本文扩展了标准 Hotelling 方法，以在两家企业集团和一家独立汽油零售商竞争时考虑捆绑折扣。我们表明捆绑销售可能导致退出并分析限制折扣的影响——澳大利亚采用的监管解决方案。最佳上限取决于监管机构的目标和退出的可能性。当不受管制的折扣导致退出时，中间上限会最大化消费者剩余。上限还确保没有消费者因折扣而变得更糟，这种结果不会发生在不受监管的折扣中。