The paper focuses on conditionality in imf programs for member states of monetary unions in light of the decision of the imf’s Executive Board on Program Design in Currency Unions (2018). Despite the growing importance of supranational institutions, the imf lacked until 2018 any explicit framework for imposing conditions on currency union bodies in cases where a member state of such a union requested an imf program. The aim of this paper is to assess the newly adopted imf approach to conditionality for currency union institutions based on the concept of “policy assurances” and to answer the question of whether the imf had authority to impose conditions on supranational institutions prior to the 2018 Board decision and whether the imf should in principle have such authority.

本文侧重于在条件IMF对货币联盟的成员国计划在该决定的光IMF的执行董事会在程序设计中的货币联盟（2018）。尽管超国家机构的重要性日益增加，但直到 2018 年，国际货币基金组织都没有任何明确的框架来在货币联盟机构的成员国请求国际货币基金组织计划的情况下对货币联盟机构施加条件。本文的目的是基于“政策保证”的概念，评估国际货币基金组织新采用的货币联盟机构条件性方法，并回答国际货币基金组织是否有权在 2018 年理事会决定之前对超国家机构施加条件，以及国际货币基金组织原则上是否应拥有此类权力。