The paper presents a theoretical model for analysis of the imperfect observability of central bank preferences by the private sector on the decisions taken by the monetary authority, and therefore, on the inflation rate. It examines, in particular, the connection which, in the presence of a time-inconsistency problem, arises between the observability of the monetary institution's goals and its equilibrium strategies. The model yields innovative results from the technical and economic points of view. From the technical point of view, it is possible to identify the conditions on the model's parameters under which a pure separating equilibrium arises, and the conditions under that there instead exists a “hybrid” equilibrium in which some types of Central Bankers adopt separating strategies whilst others adopt pooling strategies. From an economic point of view, the paper shows a number of relations that arise, in equilibrium, between the degree of observability and transparency of the Central Banker's goals and the inflation rate set by the Central Banker.

中文翻译：

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央行行长目标不完全可观察时的货币政策

本文提出了一个理论模型，用于分析私营部门对中央银行偏好的不完善可观察性对货币当局做出的决定以及通货膨胀率的影响。它特别研究了在存在时间不一致问题的情况下，货币机构目标的可观察性与其均衡策略之间产生的联系。该模型从技术和经济角度产生了创新成果。从技其他人采用汇集策略。