Abstract: Market power in electricity and emission-permit markets in the South-East Europe Regional Electricity Market, which comprises both EU members subject to the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) and non-EU members exempt from it, affects social welfare and carbon leakage. We examine its impact under three market settings: perfect competition (PC) and two leader-follower versions, in which a leader can exert market power in either the electricity market (S-T) or both the electricity and permit markets (S). Under PC, carbon leakage is equal to 11%-39% of ETS emission reduction depending on the cap stringency. Generally, in S-T, the leader's capacity withholding results in ETS emissions below and non-ETS emissions above PC levels. However, carbon leakage is lower vis-à-vis PC as the ETS emission reduction offsets the non-ETS emission increase. Finally, in S, the leader's propensity to lower the permit price increases ETS emissions and exacerbates carbon leakage compared to S-T.

中文翻译：

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东南欧区域电力市场市场支配力的经济和环境后果

摘要：东南欧区域电力市场中电力和排放许可市场的市场力量，包括受欧盟排放交易体系 (ETS) 约束的欧盟成员和不受欧盟排放交易体系 (ETS) 约束的非欧盟成员，影响社会福利和碳排放。泄漏。我们研究了它在三种市场环境下的影响：完全竞争 (PC) 和两个领导者-跟随者版本，其中领导者可以在电力市场 (ST) 或电力和许可证市场 (S) 中发挥市场力量。在 PC 下，碳泄漏等于 ETS 减排量的 11%-39%，具体取决于上限的严格程度。通常，在 ST 中，领导者的产能扣留导致 ETS 排放低于 PC 水平，而非 ETS 排放高于 PC 水平。然而，由于 ETS 减排抵消了非 ETS 排放增加，因此碳泄漏相对于 PC 而言较低。最后，在 S 中，与 ST 相比，领导者降低许可证价格的倾向会增加 ETS 排放并加剧碳泄漏。